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A STANDING FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Max Huffman*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE attractions of the U.S. forum for foreign plaintiffs; the sophis-tication of the U.S. class-action bar; steadily and rapidly increasingglobal economic interdependence; and instant around-the-world
communication have combined to bring foreign plaintiffs in ever-increas-
ing numbers into U.S. courts.1  Nowhere is this reality more apparent
than in the antitrust arena.2  The U.S. system promises “jury trials, wide-
ranging pretrial discovery without judicial supervision . . ., extraterritorial
discovery, treble damages, class actions, [and] contingent fees.”3  These
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1. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens
decision rejecting effort to sue in U.S. court under U.S. tort laws over an airplane crash
that occurred in Scotland); Smith Kline & French Labs, Ltd. v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.
1982) (Lord Denning) (“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States.  If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”);
Lily Henning, Antitrust Goes Global: D.C. Circuit Opens the Door to Foreign Victims of
Vitamin Price Fixing, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1 (“Already, some lawyers have be-
gun to cast their nets for clients, hopping planes to places as far afield as the Czech Repub-
lic to look for purchasers who bought vitamins from cartel members.”); cf. Ellen S. Podgor,
A New Dimension to the Prosecution of White Collar Crime: Enforcing Extraterritorial So-
cial Harms, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 94 (2006) (citing considerations of “increased
travel, commerce, and accessibility to communicate with other countries”).
2. Cf. Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive Territoriality”: A New Paradigm for the Prosecu-
tion of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 20 (2002) (“The
most noticeable business crimes area with cases extending jurisdiction beyond the borders
of the United States is in the area of antitrust.”) (citing United States v. Nippon Paper
Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)); cf. id. at 17 (arguing that challenges associated with
globalization are unique to business crimes and torts).
3. Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 516 (1998). See also, e.g., HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 63 (2005) (noting
the uniqueness to the U.S. system of trials by lay juries in antitrust actions); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1017, 1017, 1018-19 (1998) (noting the lack of an available pre-trial discovery in civil
law jurisdictions).  With specific regard to the treble damages remedy, “the United States
103
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features—as well as the very existence of the private action itself, which is
more limited or entirely lacking in many foreign jurisdictions4—combine
to create “a multi-color brochure for international antitrust tourism.”5
Efforts by private plaintiffs to enforce the U.S. antitrust laws extraterri-
torially have become an enormous industry.  The effects of those efforts
may be positive for those private plaintiffs who are successful, but they
threaten significant consequences for other plaintiffs, for defendants, and
for federal courts now faced with worldwide class actions and the attend-
ant procedural difficulties.  Defendants’ calculus of litigation risk must
undergo wholesale revision.  And extraterritorial enforcement efforts
threaten consequences for public enforcement and for international rela-
tions that are only beginning to be understood.6
. . . is the only country, except for Taiwan, which provides for punitive damages in addition
to actual damages incurred by the plaintiff.”  Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow,
Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Im-
plications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 845 (2004). But see Wolfgang
Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies and the Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of U.S. Antitrust Law 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 222 (2005) (stating
that Panama’s Competition Act permits treble damages for private plaintiffs).
4. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 59.
5. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Depart-
ment of Justice Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: Recent Legal Devel-
opments and Policy Implications, Address Before the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Fall Forum 17 (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/201509.pdf .
6. See Podgor, supra note 2, at 30 (suggesting a “defensive territoriality” approach to
avoid the “frightening” “ramifications of continuing to use a jurisdictional base that oper-
ates aggressively”); cf. Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 210 (noting that the effects test has
caused friction with foreign sovereigns).
The attention to the issues has not been confined to the courthouse.  One Department of
Justice official, addressing “U.S. ‘judicial imperialism’ in private antitrust damages ac-
tions,” noted the “level of attention and concern the [extraterritoriality] cases have at-
tracted in the international community.”  Delrahim, supra note 5, at 8-9.
Beyond merely posing difficult substantive issues, the Empagran litigation raised a hub-
bub of tremendous proportions in the international commercial and regulatory communi-
ties. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 5 GERMAN L.J. 1095, 1096 (2004) (“foreign receptivity to U.S.
enforcement efforts came to an end” as a result of the lower court’s opinion in Empagran).
The line-up of amici curiae in the Supreme Court included, on the petitioner’s side, several
national governments and business organizations. See the Supreme Court online docket
for 03-724, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/ 03-724.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
Amici included the governments of the United States, Canada, Germany, Belgium, the
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands and Japan, and business organizations
such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for International Investment,
the International Chamber of Commerce, and an association of European banks. See id.
On the respondent’s side, a public-interest firm and myriad economics and law professors
filed papers as amici. See id.  Amici for respondent included the public interest firm Public
Citizen, a so-called Committee to Support the Antitrust Laws, and several notable econo-
mists and economics professors and law professors. See id.
None of this excitement should be a surprise when one considers the size of the potential
damages awards at issue in litigation that, like Empagran, raises the possibility of applying
to claims by world-wide plaintiff classes the U.S. approach of trebling damages awards in
antitrust litigation. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).  Treble damage awards are
by no means a universally, or even commonly, accepted remedy. See Griffin, supra note 3,
at 516.  So too with procedural aspects of antitrust litigation in the United States, perhaps
most notably the class action device. See id.; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Congress sought to forestall those issues in 1982 with the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).7  When lower courts demon-
strated a failure to understand the statute, the Supreme Court took up
this problem in the most recent in a long line of decisions testing the
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws—a line extending back
nearly a century to Justice Holmes’s 1909 opinion in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.8  In the Supreme Court’s only direct foray into the
text of the FTAIA, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,9 the
Court held that the statute precluded U.S. courts’ hearing claims by for-
eign plaintiffs alleging harm felt in wholly foreign commerce.10 Em-
pagran’s narrow holding applied to claims of foreign harm with no nexus
to an effect in domestic U.S. commerce.11
The Empagran Court included in its opinion an important exception.
While plaintiffs not alleging a sufficient nexus between an effect in do-
mestic commerce and their own wholly foreign harm are precluded from
suit in federal court, plaintiffs able sufficiently to show that “the anticom-
petitive conduct’s domestic effects were linked to [their] foreign harm”
are excepted from the limitation.12  This is the “Empagran exception.”
Ongoing litigation in lower courts shows the Empagran exception en-
courages artful pleading of nexuses between domestic effects and foreign
harm, injecting as much uncertainty into the extraterritoriality analysis
and into the understanding of the FTAIA as existed before Empagran.13
On remand (Empagran II),14 the lower court held that the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations—that fixed prices in domestic U.S. commerce were the but-for
cause of their harm as purchasers in wholly foreign commerce—fell short
of the nexus requirement.15  Some courts have followed suit, and some
have diverged.16  As these inconsistent decisions show, the battle over
extraterritoriality now has shifted to how to define the degree of nexus
required under the Empagran exception.17  This issue will not resolve it-
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 6(a).
8. 203 U.S. 347 (1909). See generally Max Huffman, A Retrospective on 25 Years of
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 70 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
9. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
10. Id. at 159.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 175; see S. Lynn Diamond, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects:
Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 805, 806 (2006).
13. See infra notes 194-227 and accompanying text (describing cases); Diamond, supra
note 12, at 829 (arguing the Empagran decision has paved the way for another circuit split
on the meaning of the Empagran exception).
14. Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1043 (2006) [hereinafter Empagran II].
15. Id. at 1271.
16. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 810; see also infra notes 215-234 and accompanying
text (discussion of the cases).
17. See, e.g., Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1270-71 (holding that the Empagran exception
requires allegations that harm suffered in foreign commerce was proximately caused by an
effect felt in domestic U.S. commerce). See also Diamond, supra note 12, at 808 (noting
the confusion over the degree of nexus between foreign injury and domestic effects re-
quired by Empagran).
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self neatly.  With the steadily increasing interdependence of the world
economy,18 private efforts to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially will con-
tinue to be a hotbed of litigation activity.19
This Article explores the Empagran exception and proposes a compre-
hensive approach for its application.  The Article proceeds in three parts.
Part II gives a background of the statutory scheme and the prudential
antitrust standing doctrine.  Part III argues that the FTAIA, as inter-
preted by the Empagran Court, is best understood by reference to princi-
ples of antitrust standing, although the Court declined expressly to invoke
the doctrine.  Part IV examines courts’ recent efforts to apply the Em-
pagran exception and shows how standing doctrine will improve on those
efforts.
This Article concludes that courts’ efforts to apply the Empagran ex-
ception demonstrate failure to understand the essential legal scheme.
Well-understood principles of antitrust standing, a prudential doctrine
that permits courts to deny plaintiffs the right to sue if they are not ap-
propriately efficient vindicators of the policies underlying the U.S. anti-
trust laws, together with other prudential considerations recognized by
the Empagran Court, offer optimal means of dealing with issues of extra-
territorial application going forward.
II. BACKGROUND OF STANDING AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST STANDING
Standing is a threshold inquiry a court should address before turning to
the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.20  Standing doctrine exists to ensure the
18. See, e.g., Goeffrey C. Hazard et al., Introduction to the Principles and Rules of
Transnational Civil Procedure, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 769, 769 (2001); Levenstein
& Suslow, supra note 3, at 805 (discussing forty-two multinational cartels in the 1990s);
John M. Connor, Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence of Private Interna-
tional Cartels, Purdue Univ. Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Staff Paper 04-08, at 1 (2004) (“Today,
many industries are led by a few multinational companies with sales spread across the
Northern Hemisphere . . . .”).
19. See Delrahim, supra note 5, at 17; 2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 13:23 (3d ed. 1997)
(This issue is being tested in the current wave of cases testing whether for-
eign purchasers injured abroad may sue in the United States when there is a
substantial domestic impact, but where the plaintiff’s injury is felt solely
outside the United States . . . .  Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in
Empagran, important questions remain as what circumstances, if any, foreign
antitrust plaintiffs suffering injury abroad can bring their claims to U.S.
courts.  Years of additional litigation or statutory change will be necessary to
definitively resolve this critical question.)
(footnotes omitted). See also id. § 9:7 (“The FTAIA is an immensely important statute.”).
Cf. John H. Robinson, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: Preliminary Re-
flections, 27 J.C. & U.L. 187, 203 (2000) (predicting a “flood of private international
litigation”).
20. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW § 3.03(d), at 97 (2003) (noting that “the antitrust injury doctrine depends less
on the plaintiff’s proof than on its theory of injury, and theories that do not depend on
proof are well suited to pre-discovery disposition”); id. § 3.03(a), at 91 (antitrust injury
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plaintiff suing is appropriately situated to vindicate the purposes of the
antitrust laws.21  The purpose of the private action, in turn, is twofold: (1)
deterring conduct Congress has determined to be inimical to U.S. eco-
nomic interests, and (2) compensating plaintiffs for harm suffered by an
antitrust violation.22
Antitrust standing doctrine enjoys a long pedigree.  The common-law
background to the Clayton Act section 4 (“Clayton 4”),23 the private
right of action provision of the antitrust scheme, was rife with extra-statu-
tory limitations on recovery.24  Primary limitations included such well-
known concepts as proximate cause and certainty of damages.25  Early
judicial glosses on the Sherman Act section 7, the precursor to Clayton 4,
imposed those common-law limitations to suits by antitrust plaintiffs.26
Reliance on common-law principles was carried forward with the enact-
ment of Clayton 4 and remains the norm today.27
There are three faces to the modern antitrust standing analysis.  The
first is the question of antitrust injury, a doctrine most prominently attrib-
doctrine “enables antitrust courts to dispose of more claims at an early stage of litigation
by simply examining the logic of the plaintiff’s theory of injury”) (citing Juster Assocs. v.
City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1990)).
“The essential attribute of the standing determination has always been that it was a
question whether to decide . . . .”  Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 669 (1973).
21. This understanding of the doctrine grounds it squarely in the broader classical pru-
dential standing framework. See Scott, supra note 20, at 647 (quoting HENRY M. HART &
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 174 (1953))
(standing ensures the plaintiff has “a sufficient personal interest” or is a “sufficiently ap-
propriate representative” of other interested plaintiffs).
22. See Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1127, 1127 (1976); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1450-51 (1985) (citing Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analyti-
cal Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).  The section reads in pertinent part:
(a) Amount of recovery; prejudgment interest
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . .
24. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 532-33 (1983).
25. See id. at 532 (citing FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 292-312
(2d ed. 1925), and 3 JOHN D. LAWSON, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND PRACTICE 1740 (1890)).
As Judge Posner colorfully has noted, these limitations include the following:
[V]enerable principles of tort causation illustrated by Gorris v. Scott, 9 L.R.
Ex.-125 (1874).  The plaintiff’s animals, which were being transported on the
deck of the defendant’s ship, were washed overboard in a storm.  They would
have been saved if the deck had been penned, as required by statute.  But
since the purpose of the statute was to prevent contagion, not drowning, the
defendant was not liable.
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (no standing
for shareholder of victim company because the injury was “indirect, remote and
consequential”).
27. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 531 (“Congress intended the [Sher-
man] Act to be construed in the light of its common-law background.”); cf. Am. Soc’y of
Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 568 n.6 (1982) (“imposing liability . . .
in accord with those common-law [agency] principles honors the congressional intent be-
hind the antitrust statutes”).
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uted to Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,28 which requires the in-
jury over which a plaintiff sues to be an injury of the sort the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent.29  The second is the “indirect purchaser”
analysis from Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.30  As among plaintiffs who seek
standing as customers, only those that purchased directly from the defen-
dant have standing to sue for antitrust injury.31  The third face of the
standing inquiry is a vaguely defined amalgam of considerations contrib-
uting to the prudential question whether a court should entertain a pri-
vate antitrust action.32
1. The Classical Standing Framework
The Supreme Court’s most complete and coherent statement of the an-
titrust standing doctrine came in Associated General Contractors of Cali-
fornia v. California State Council of Carpenters.33  The Court announced
an inquiry involving five considerations courts should balance to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff is appropriately situated to vindicate the poli-
cies of the antitrust laws.34  Those considerations included the following:
(1) the question of antitrust injury; (2) whether the plaintiff is a direct
purchaser; (3) whether other plaintiffs are available to sue if standing is
denied to this plaintiff; (4) concerns for “judicial manageability”; and (5)
concerns for “either the risk of duplicate recoveries . . . or the danger of
complex apportionment of damages.”35
28. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
29. Harm is a requirement of the prudential antitrust standing doctrine, which turns in
part on whether a plaintiff’s “harm” can be termed “antitrust injury.” See Associated Gen.
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535; Brunswick, 459 U.S. at 489. See also Areeda, supra note 22, at
1130; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury and the Evolu-
tion of Antitrust Law, 17 ANTITRUST 20, 20-21 (2002).  Harm is also a requirement of Arti-
cle III standing.  As a constitutional matter, federal courts only have the power to hear a
case if there is “injury in fact.” See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31
(differentiating between Article III standing and antitrust standing).  “Antitrust injury” is
injury that flows from a violation of the antitrust laws, and not just from a violation, but
from that which made the conduct illegal. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486-87 (rejecting the
argument that plaintiffs need only prove “they are in a worse position than they would
have been had petitioner not committed those acts,” and requiring proof of “antitrust in-
jury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful”).
30. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
31. Id. at 729.
32. The plaintiff must be an appropriately efficient plaintiff to vindicate the purposes
of the antitrust laws.  In addition to antitrust injury, to have antitrust standing the plaintiff
must convince the court that factors such as the directness of the injury, the existence of
other plaintiffs, concerns for manageability of the litigation, and the danger of complex
damages apportionment weigh in favor of the plaintiff’s suit proceeding. See Associated
Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540-44.
33. Id. at 519. See generally deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510,
513 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that “analysis of standing under [Clayton Act] § 4“ should
start “with the Supreme Court opinions [in Associated General Contractors and Blue Shield
of Virginia v. McReady, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)]”).
34. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540-44.
35. Id.
Courts and commentators differ on the precise formulation of the Associated General
Contractors factors.  For example, one commentator has read into Associated General Con-
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Antitrust injury requires that the plaintiff “must prove . . . injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”36 Brunswick held a plaintiff
could not sue for injury caused by an increase in competition from the
defendant’s acquisition of the plaintiff’s competitor.37  Other contexts of
the application of the injury doctrine include preventing claims by em-
ployees alleging harm from conduct that harms their employers and
claims by plaintiffs with a business relationship with the victim of an anti-
trust violation.38  The injury doctrine “is typically interpreted as a re-
quirement that the plaintiff’s injury result from increased prices or
decreased output.”39
Illinois Brick precludes plaintiffs from suing as purchasers alleging
harm on a pass-through theory, whereby the harm suffered from paying
inflated prices to a middleman is derivative of the middleman’s own
harm.40  The primary concern underlying the Illinois Brick holding is the
tractors a sixth element in the standing analysis, that of the defendant’s intent toward the
particular plaintiff. See C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies:
The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (cit-
ing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537). See also Associated Gen. Contractors,
459 U.S. at 537 n.35 (“specific intent of defendant to cause injury to a particular class of
persons should ‘ordinarily be dispositive’ in creating standing to sue”) (citation omitted);
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 963 (10th Cir. 1990) (high-
lighting evidence that the defendant “specifically intended to harm” the plaintiff).  The
opaque discussion in Associated General Contractors of this element concludes that “im-
proper motive . . . is not a panacea that will enable any complaint to withstand a motion to
dismiss.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537. “[T]he motive allegation [is not] of
controlling importance.” Id. at 537 n.37.
36. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
The injury requirement is analogous to the “directness” requirement of the broader pru-
dential standing framework. See Scott, supra note 20, at 652.  And while the current state-
ment of the antitrust injury rationale is less than thirty years old, the doctrine has a long
pedigree.  As early as 1910, the Third Circuit held that “neither a creditor nor a stock-
holder . . . that was injured by a violation of the antitrust laws could recover treble dam-
ages.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533 (citing Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910)).
37. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489-90.  The plaintiff alleged the competitor otherwise
would have gone out of business, giving plaintiff a monopoly. Id. at 488; Roger D. Blair &
William H. Page, The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing, in
ECONOMIC IMPORTS, LEGAL OUTPUTS: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN MODERN ANTITRUST
69, 70 (Fred S. McChensey ed., 1998).  The Court noted that “if respondents were injured
. . ., while respondents’ loss occurred ‘by reason of’ the unlawful acquisitions, it did not
occur ‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions unlawful.” Brunswick, 429 U.S. at
488.  “What made the merger unlawful, however, was the potential for predatory behavior
on Brunswick’s part.  But this had nothing to do with Pueblo’s reduced profits.”  Blair &
Page, supra, at 70.
38. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trott, J.,
concurring) (no antitrust standing for business associates of victim of an antitrust viola-
tion); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 751 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (dissenting from a finding of employee standing).  Those types of cases have in
common the fact that the plaintiff’s harm is derivative of the harm suffered by another.
39. Paul J. Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 949,
972 (2005).
40. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the plaintiffs alleged harm from a price-fixing con-
spiracy.  431 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1977).  The plaintiffs did not purchase directly from the
defendants, but were end users of the products. Id. at 727.  They alleged harm on a “pass-
through” theory. Id.  The direct purchasers were distributors, who sold to contractors,
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resulting duplicate recovery if both direct and indirect plaintiffs are able
to sue.41 Another concern is preventing undue complexity of damages
calculations.42 Illinois Brick serves the same essential function as the an-
titrust injury element in the case of plaintiffs who are purchasers, rather
than competitors.43
The other three elements of the Associated General Contractors stand-
ing inquiry speak generally to the question whether the plaintiff is an
efficient vindicator of the purposes of the antitrust laws.  A failure to es-
tablish one or all of the remaining elements should not destroy standing
for a plaintiff that can establish antitrust injury or, if relevant, direct
purchase.  But meeting the latter three elements might perhaps create
standing where the first two elements are not met.44  For example, in Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready, a patient was held to have standing to sue
her health insurance provider, alleging a conspiracy to exclude psycholo-
gists from Blue Shield’s health plans.45  The McCready plaintiff failed
both the injury and indirect purchaser tests but was permitted to sue
nonetheless.46
Standing more likely will be found for the particular plaintiff before the
who in turn sold to plaintiffs. Id. at 726.  They claimed to pay higher prices for the prod-
ucts because the direct purchasers’ prices were passed to their customers, who in turn
passed them on to the plaintiffs. Id. at 724.
41. Id. at 730-31 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972)).
42. Id. at 731-32.  Professor Hovenkamp argues that Illinois Brick overstates the diffi-
culty of calculating damages to indirect purchasers because the calculation need not in-
volve the impossible calculation of passed-on damages. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at
74-75.  He recommends Illinois Brick be overruled. See id. at 306-07.
43. But cf. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264 (holding a state does not have standing to sue
in parens patriae status for harm to its general economy based partly on a concern for
duplicate recovery).
The “business associate” form of derivative harm, see Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315,
is more closely analogous to the Illinois Brick rule than it is to the Brunswick rule.  A
business associate of a direct victim certainly suffers harm from that which made the defen-
dant’s conduct illegal, but the harm is derivative.  So too with the harm suffered by an
indirect purchaser.
Professor Hovenkamp recently has argued that the Illinois Brick rule is under-deterrent
in that not all of harm suffered by an antitrust violation is remediable. See HOVENKAMP,
supra note 3, at 73-76.  Professor Stancil is in accord.  “Illinois Brick has had a substantial
chilling effect on all types of private antitrust litigation.  In the thousands of industries
typified by multiple layers of distribution, Illinois Brick completely denies relief to the
ultimate consumers of a product.”  Stancil, supra note 39, at 975.  More, under Illinois
Brick, the parties furthest removed from the violation, and thus least able to protect them-
selves through contract, are precluded from a remedy in antitrust. Cf. id. (suit left to direct
purchasers “who have existing commercial relationships with the wrongdoers”).
44. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (1982) (finding
standing in a situation in which commentators agree antitrust injury was not satisfied).
45. Id. at 478-81.
46. The much-criticized holding in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready is supported by
the “other plaintiff” element of the standing analysis. See id. at 484-85 (Clayton § 4 applies
to “any person” injured “by reason of” an antitrust violation).  In McCready, there was
concern that if this plaintiff did not sue, no plaintiff was available to sue.
For criticism of McCready, see, e.g., id. at 485-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Page, supra
note 22, at 1449 (“The Court’s attempt to fit the various doctrines into a coherent pattern,
however, was notably unsuccessful. McCready is particularly unfortunate because it seri-
ously undermines the concept of antitrust injury.”).
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court if no other private persons would make appropriate plaintiffs.47
The “other plaintiff” element is explained by the perhaps self-evident
proposition that for the deterrent function of the private remedy to be
fulfilled, some private plaintiff should be able to sue to vindicate harm
caused by an antitrust violation.  If no other private plaintiff exists, and
the other elements of the Associated General Contractors analysis are sat-
isfied, it would frustrate the purposes of the private remedy to deny
standing to this plaintiff.48
The “other plaintiff” element is difficult to justify under the compensa-
tion rationale for the private antitrust action.  A plaintiff that has suffered
antitrust injury should be entitled to an opportunity to prove its right to
compensation, whether or not other plaintiffs also enjoy a right to seek
compensation.49  For this reason, the “other plaintiff” element should not
be permitted to destroy standing that exists under antitrust injury and
direct purchase.  The compensation function will be served only if every
plaintiff suffering antitrust injury is permitted to sue.50
Standing is less likely to be found if a suit by that plaintiff would be
unmanageable for the court system.51  The Court in Associated General
Contractors gave scant indication how to understand this element of the
analysis.52  Antitrust injury and direct purchase are specific instances of
47. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 542 (1983).
48. Professor Hovenkamp notes, “[o]f course, the remote plaintiff may become the
only one when the immediate victim has some reason to avoid suing or is itself deficient in
standing, antitrust injury, or ability to prove damages.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 20, § 3.05e, at 112-13.
49. Cf. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1999-2000 (2006) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the Court’s approach also eliminates recov-
ery for plaintiffs whose injuries are precisely those that Congress aimed to remedy through
the authorization of civil RICO suits”); id. at 2003 (“our recognition in Holmes [v. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992)] that limiting recovery to direct victims
would not undermine deterrence does not support the conclusion that any victim whose
lawsuit is unnecessary for deterrence is an indirect victim”).
50. See id. at 2003 (“If multiple plaintiffs are direct victims of a tort, it would be unjust
to declare some of their lawsuits unnecessary for deterrence, absent any basis for doing so
in the relevant statute.”).
But see Page, supra note 22, at 1452 (“If compensation were taken as a standard, then all
causally related harms would be compensable, and the resulting deterrent effects would be
unpredictable from an economic point of view.”).  Professor Page’s argument assumes the
compensation function is permitted to override the antitrust injury requirement.  This Arti-
cle treats the injury element as an essential prerequisite to achieving the appropriate level
of compensation.
51. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543 n.50 (noting that a concern for judi-
cial manageability was discussed in the legislative history of the Sherman Act).  State-
ments by Senator Edmunds contained in the legislative history of the Sherman Act noted
concerns that “everybody might sue everybody else in one common suit and have a regular
pot-pourri of the affair . . . and take twenty years in order to get a result as to a single one
of them.” Id. at 544 n.50 (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 3148 (1890)).
52. An analogy might be made to the context of class action certification.  One re-
quirement for certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is that
the class be manageable.  “Manageable,” in the context of Rule 23, requires a court to
balance the benefits to be gained from certification against the administrative and ministe-
rial challenges inherent in entertaining the action as a class action.  7AA CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2005).  Certification
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the application of the manageability element.53  The more direct a plain-
tiff’s injury, the less danger of “long and complicated proceedings involv-
ing massive evidence and complicated theories.”54  If a plaintiff’s harm is
a sort meant to be protected against, the unmanageability threshold the
system should be willing to endure to provide that plaintiff a remedy is
much higher.55
For the compensation function of the private remedy to be served, the
manageability element cannot destroy standing that exists under the first
two elements.  A simple cost-benefit analysis supports this conclusion.
The marginal cost to the system of each additional plaintiff, especially in
the context of class action litigation, is small and decreasing, and the dif-
ference between the marginal benefit to the plaintiff and the marginal
cost to the defendant from permitting each individual plaintiff to sue re-
mains constant as the number of plaintiffs increases.  Thus, the same ar-
guments for permitting one plaintiff to sue support permitting another to
sue.  The result is that if a plaintiff can demonstrate antitrust injury and
direct purchase, no matter how unwieldy the litigation, that plaintiff
should be permitted to sue.56
Courts also should consider whether permitting the plaintiff’s suit
would create the risk of complex apportionment of damages.57  The ar-
chetypal example of denying standing for concerns of complexity is Ha-
waii v. Standard Oil Co.58  The Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
denied standing to sue in parens patriae status to a state government
seeking to collect for harm suffered generally in the state economy.59  An
important underpinning of that holding was the impossibility of proving
the amount of relief to be awarded.60  The Court re-emphasized the com-
should not be granted if the challenges are not overborne by corresponding efficiency ben-
efits. Id.  Analogous to Senator Edmunds’ concerns in 1890, the manageability criterion
aims to streamline the “interminable litigation” that might occur when large numbers, all
claiming an interest in the subject matter of a suit, are permitted to sue.
53. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543.
54. Id. (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968)).
55. Determining whether the concern for unmanageability should be permitted to
override a plaintiff’s right to compensation involves a calculus of the systemic costs from
suit measured against the overall benefits directly attributable to the suit.
56. If the fact of unmanageability of the litigation can undo standing for private plain-
tiffs, an antitrust violator would be well-served to harm as many plaintiffs as possible—the
opposite of the deterrence goal of the private remedy. Cf. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 52
(noting concerns for procedural limits on class actions different from the right of the plain-
tiff to sue, giving defendants incentives to harm as many plaintiffs as possible, thereby
undermining manageability).
57. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545.
58. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
59. See id. at 262-66.
60. Id. at 264 n.14 (“Measurement of an injury to the general economy, on the other
hand, necessarily involves an examination of the impact of a restraint of trade upon every
variable that affects the State’s economic health—a task extremely difficult, ‘in the real
economic world rather than an economist’s hypothetical model.’”) (quoting Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968)). Standard Oil also relied
on the danger of duplicate recovery, the rationale underlying Illinois Brick.  Ill. Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977) (citing Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264).
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plexity concern in the 2006 Term in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.61  In
that case, decided under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (“RICO”), which contains a private right of action provi-
sion modeled on Clayton 4,62 the Court noted the “complex assessment”
that would be required to determine which of the plaintiff’s losses were
attributable to the defendant’s conduct.63
2. Protecting the Purposes of Private Enforcement
Scholarship supports the proposition that the ideal private remedy is
one that serves perfectly the deterrent function.64  The challenge facing
courts is to fashion remedies that both deter and compensate appropri-
ately—a process to which scholars have referred as “optimizing” reme-
dies.65  Four interrelated bodies of doctrine—substantive standards for
antitrust liability,66 subject-matter jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust courts,67
the scope of the treble damages remedy,68 and standing for private anti-
trust plaintiffs69—operate to create, and to limit, the recovery available to
a private antitrust plaintiff.70  Of those, the prudential standing analysis is
the best candidate for optimizing the remedies available to private plain-
61. 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006).
62. See id. at 1996; Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 260 (1992); Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. 519.
63. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997 (“Businesses lose and gain customers for many reasons,
and it would require a complex assessment to establish what portion of Ideal’s lost sales
were the product of National’s decreased prices.”).  The Court also specifically distin-
guished the complexity concern from the Illinois Brick concern for duplicate recoveries.
Id. at 1997-98.
64. Page, supra note 22, at 1450-52.  Professor Page has argued that of the dual pur-
poses of private antitrust enforcement, “the deterrent function must predominate” in de-
termining the appropriate private remedy. See id. at 1451.  Professor Page argues that
deterrence makes compensation to private plaintiffs unnecessary. Id. at 1452.  That argu-
ment creates a chicken and egg problem—compensation is necessary to incentivize private
plaintiffs to bring suit to deter violations.  Professor Page implicitly recognizes the role of
compensation in evaluating the perfect antitrust remedy: “Any system of deterrence must
define the size of the deterrent penalty and identify the person who will bring suit.” Id.
(emphasis added).
65. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 66-67; KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: EC-
ONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 43-44, 49-52 (2003); William M. Landes,
Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 678 (1983).
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
67. Subject-matter jurisdiction generally has been the repository of the extraterritori-
ality analysis. See id. § 6(a) (FTAIA); see generally infra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text.
68. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
69. See Page, supra note 22, at 1446-47 (treating antitrust standing, the Illinois Brick
doctrine, and the antitrust injury doctrine from Brunswick as “three major doctrines [that]
have been called into service” to “set economically rational limits on the size of treble
damage liability and on the frequency of antitrust litigation”). Associated General Contrac-
tors treated those doctrines as elements of the standing analysis. See Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983).
70. One more body of doctrine that might be thought to contribute to the goal of
optimizing remedies is the body of rules for pleading an antitrust case. See generally Brief
for Legal Scholars Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 575 (2006) (No. 05-1126).
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tiffs in light of the purposes those remedies should serve.71  Whether and
how remedies are to be administered depends largely on the prudential
question which plaintiffs will be permitted to sue.72
A problem unique to private enforcement is that plaintiffs are—and
should be—motivated solely by their individual best interests.73  They are
thus ill-incentivized to temper their litigation with broader systemic con-
cerns.  By contrast, the federal enforcement agencies in recent decades
have operated with views toward the policies of economic efficiency most
courts and commentators agree should be advanced by U.S. antitrust
enforcement.74
But little incentive exists for private plaintiffs to limit their claims, so
the remedy does not result in too great of deterrence by the defendant.75
In private enforcement, then, courts are given the task of optimizing rem-
71. See Page, supra note 22, at 1450 (noting the “complementary relationship” of anti-
trust injury and standing “in approximating the standard of optimal deterrence”).  Substan-
tive standards for liability, subject-matter jurisdiction, and the scope of the treble damages
remedy, which are the most firmly grounded in statute and the least malleable, are the least
likely candidates for optimization. But see HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 305-06 (recom-
mending amendments to the antitrust laws to reduce the use of treble damages remedy).
72. See Page, supra note 22, at 1446-47 (describing “three major doctrines” that are
employed to “set economically rational limits on the size of treble damage liability and on
the frequency of antitrust litigation.”).  This Article has argued that the three doctrines are
subsumed into the Associated General Contractors standing analysis.
73. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that private plaintiffs are not con-
cerned with general welfare); Page, supra note 22, at 1445 (“firms quite rationally employ a
rent-seeking antitrust strategy, whose aim is not only to exact treble damages, but to inhibit
rivalry and efficient distribution practices”); Stancil, supra note 39, at 950 (“[p]rivate par-
ties act in their own perceived self-interest”).  Professor Hylton also argues that the private
right of action provision in Clayton 4 is exceptionally broad. See HYLTON, supra note 65,
at 58 (“There is probably no more plaintiff-friendly statute in all of the federal laws.”).
74. See United States v. Syufy Enters., Inc., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); Brief of the
United States at 1, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 575 (2006) (No. 05-1126),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/3mer/1ami/2005-1126.mer.ami.pdf (noting
that the Department of Justice “seeks to further ‘our fundamental national economic pol-
icy’ of competition” in its antitrust enforcement efforts). See generally William E. Kovacic,
The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
377 (2003).
As to the relevance of economic analysis to antitrust enforcement generally, see for ex-
ample, Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: The Intractable Problem of
Antitrust Jurisdiction, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1, 1 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). See also
generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (Rev. ed. 1993); HYLTON, supra
note 65; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2002); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991);
Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165,
168, 170 (2005); Stancil, supra note 39, at 958-59 (detailing the progression of antitrust
values culminating in the “consumer welfare” standard).
75. An exception might exist for a plaintiff that might find itself a defendant in future
litigation raising the same issues.  Research has uncovered no analysis of the degree to
which private plaintiffs consider their own potential future liability in their litigation deci-
sions.  Such an analysis would be helpful in understanding parties’ litigation decisions.
Psychological factors are relevant here as well.  Private plaintiffs overvalue their claim
because they might be blind to factors apart from the defendant’s conduct—such as mis-
management of their business—that caused or contributed to the harm they suffered.  The
massive incentives for private plaintiffs to engage in antitrust litigation overwhelm any
realistic hopes for self selection.
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edies.76  That is a question of balancing concerns for over-deterrence and
under-deterrence.
Over-deterrence is the chilling of economically useful conduct through
the specter of the liability that will be imposed if that useful conduct
should cause harm.77  A standard of remedying harm that risks producing
“false positives”—liability where no anticompetitive conduct actually
took place—is bothersome twice over.  First, it unfairly imposes liability
on innocent conduct.  Second, it prevents possible defendants from toeing
the line between stridently competitive, highly desirable activity and an-
ticompetitive conduct.
The opposite concern is that of under-deterrence.  If the total liability
stemming from anticompetitive conduct, discounted by the likelihood
that liability will be imposed at all, is less than the total expected benefit
from the conduct, rational economic actors will engage in the conduct.78
Conversely, if the total liability appropriately discounted exceeds the to-
tal expected benefit, they will not.  The under-deterrence concern arises if
either (1) the regulatory regime insufficiently penalizes conduct, or (2)
the judicial system somehow fails to give full effect to the regulatory
scheme.
A twist on the under-deterrence concern is an “inverse deterrence” ar-
gument that came to the fore in Empagran.  Under the inverse deterrence
argument, excessive private enforcement produces negative externalities
that harm public enforcement efforts.  This harm occurs because in recent
years, public anti-cartel enforcement relies heavily on the Department of
Justice’s leniency program to uncover criminal antitrust conspiracies.79
The leniency program permits the first cartel member to disclose the car-
76. Professor Stancil argues “it is absolutely critical that (1) the law minimize the costs
associated with inefficient opportunistic behavior on the part of private plaintiffs, and (2)
the private enforcement mechanism reflects the current balance of policy considerations
governing public enforcement.”  Stancil, supra note 39, at 950.
77. See generally HYLTON, supra note 65, at 43-47 (defining over-deterrence as the
deterrence of “some monopolizing activity that actually increases society’s wealth”) (citing
Landes, supra note 65, and Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 217 (1968)).
78. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978).  Professor Hylton
defines under-deterrence as the failure to “discourage conduct that reduces society’s
wealth.” HYLTON, supra note 65, at 43 (analyzing the size of damages award necessary to
ensure sufficient deterrence).  Professor Landes would define the concept more narrowly
such that the cost of discouraging the conduct is part of the consideration whether the
welfare loss the conduct causes is tolerable. See Landes, supra note 65, at 678.
79. See Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees, at 19-21, Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-7115). See also Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Seven Steps to Better Cartel Enforcement, Presentation to the 11th Annual
Competition Law and Policy Workshop, European Institute 1 (Jun. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216453.pdf. (describing the amnesty program as
one of seven prongs of the Department of Justice’s cartel enforcement strategy); id. at 6-7
(describing the operation and importance of DOJ’s amnesty program).
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tel and cooperate with prosecutors to avoid criminal prosecution.80  But it
says nothing about civil liability that might follow.81  Excessive potential
civil liability decreases the likelihood that avoiding criminal liability is a
sufficient incentive for a member to disclose participation in a cartel.82
B. ANALYSIS OF THE FTAIA
Congress in 1982 recognized the burgeoning antitrust extraterritoriality
issues.  It enacted the FTAIA to define the scope of appropriate extrater-
ritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws.83  Although “an immensely
important statute,”84 the FTAIA received little attention for nearly two
80. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE: ANTITRUST DIV., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm [hereinafter CORPO-
RATE LENIENCY POLICY].
81. See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The
trial court in Kruman noted the following:
In January 2000, word leaked that Christie’s had availed itself of the amnesty
program of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
and confessed that it had engaged in fixing prices of auction services with
Sotheby’s.  As one might expect, a veritable flood of class actions was filed in
response to this news, each seeking to recover damages under the United
States antitrust laws on behalf of variously described classes of purchasers
and sellers who bought or sold through these houses at non-internet auctions
in the United States.
Id.
82. Then, and somewhat circularly, because of the prima facie effect of a criminal con-
viction of antitrust conduct in a private antitrust suit, the public enforcement efforts usually
provide the driving force behind private suits.  So, according to the inverse deterrence
argument, excessive potential civil liability can decrease the effectiveness of antitrust en-
forcement at all levels.  In effect, the inverse deterrence rationale threatens the same effect
as under-deterrence—reducing the regulatory scheme’s effectiveness at uncovering ex-
isting antitrust conspiracies.
Congress in 2004 passed the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 666 (2004), limiting to mere compensatory relief the dam-
ages available from a defendant that had availed itself of the amnesty program. See 15
U.S.C. § 213(a) (2000).  The limitation should reduce, although not eliminate, cartel mem-
bers’ disincentives to turn state’s evidence.  Research does not uncover analyses of the
statute’s effectiveness.
83. Id. § 6(a).  The FTAIA reads in full:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with for-
eign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign na-
tions; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of
this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the interpretation of
paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for
injury to export business in the United States.
84. 1 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST & AM. BUSINESS ABROAD § 9:7 (3d ed.
Supp. 2005).
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decades85—perhaps because of its opacity,86 perhaps because it appeared
merely to codify existing law,87 or perhaps because the global stage was
not until recently set for the current wave of multinational litigation.88
Even the Supreme Court’s highly contentious 1993 extraterritoriality de-
cision, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,89 relegated the primary
FTAIA analysis to a footnote.90  In recent years, clever arguments by
plaintiffs’ counsel have resuscitated the statute.91  Shortly after the turn
of the century, courts began to be receptive to those arguments.92
Like other statutes that memorialize limitations on courts’ power,93 the
FTAIA first takes away courts’ authority over all antitrust claims in
wholly foreign or export commerce—then gives some back.  Congress
provided that the antitrust laws “shall not apply to conduct” involving
wholly foreign commerce or export trade or export commerce, “unless”
an exception is met.94  The exception is comprised of two primary parts.
Subsection one requires that for conduct to be within the reach of the
antitrust laws, it must have “a direct, substantial and reasonably foresee-
able effect” on domestic commerce, import commerce, or the business of
85. See Delrahim, supra note 5, at 3 (“it lay almost unnoticed in dusty pages of the
United States Code”).
86. See 2 WALLER, supra note 19, § 13.23 (noting the “obscure and badly drafted For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act”); id. § 9:7 (“At a linguistic level, this statute clari-
fies nothing.”); Diamond, supra note 12, at 819 (the FTAIA “is widely considered to be a
poorly drafted statute”) (citing Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d
Cir. 2002)).  Delrahim, supra note 5, at 3 (noting the underuse of the FTAIA “may have
something to do with” the FTAIA’s “‘inelegant phras[ing]’”).  Opacity is not a powerful
indictment of an antitrust law.  It might be considered a defining characteristic of the anti-
trust laws. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 (2d ed. 2001).
87. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)
(“Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any signif-
icant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce.”) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 97-686 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487-88); Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993).
88. See generally Huffman, supra note 8.  The statute has received more attention in
the past fifteen years, during which time the detection and prosecution of international
cartels became much more common. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 801 (not-
ing that in the 1990s “the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission prose-
cuted over forty international cartels for illegal price fixing”).
89. 509 U.S. 764.
90. See id. at 796 n.23.
91. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l P.L.C., 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Den Norske Stals
Oljeselskap As v. HeercMac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). There is irony in plain-
tiffs’ counsel bringing this statute to the fore.  It was enacted to limit U.S. antitrust courts’
extraterritorial reach. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169; The In Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Print-
ables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (noting that the statute was a response
to complaints by American firms that the U.S. antitrust scheme made them less competi-
tive on the world stage). See generally Huffman, supra note 8.
92. See Empagran, 315 F.3d 338; Kruman, 284 F.3d 384.
93. Ready examples include the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(2005) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2005). See
MacArthur Area Citizens Ass’n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 919-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(comparing the FTCA with the FSIA).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (quoted in full supra note 83); see ALSO Empagran, 542 U.S.
at 162.
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U.S. exporters.95  Subsection two requires further that the conduct “give
rise to a claim” under the substantive antitrust laws.96
III. ANTITRUST STANDING IN EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION
The Empagran litigation is the source of the modern rules governing
extraterritoriality.  The Empagran plaintiffs sued vitamin manufacturers
alleging price fixing—a violation of Sherman Act section 1 that regularly
gives rise to civil and criminal penalties97—on a worldwide scale.98  The
plaintiffs, distributors of vitamins from around the globe, originally were
a class of “foreign and domestic purchasers of vitamins.”99
The defendants’ arguments for dismissing the foreign purchasers’
claims proceeded on two fronts.  First, the defendants contended the
FTAIA limited the court’s jurisdiction to claims of domestic harm felt as
a result of the effect of antitrust-violative conduct on domestic U.S. com-
merce.100  Second, defendants contended the foreign purchasers lacked
standing to sue.101  Under the antitrust standing approach, unless the
plaintiffs suffered injuries flowing from that which makes the defendant’s
acts unlawful—which, defendants’ argued, were the effects of the alleged
conduct on U.S. commerce—the plaintiff’s injuries should not be cogniza-
ble in federal court applying U.S. antitrust laws.102  In an argument fore-
shadowing the Supreme Court’s ultimate analysis, the United States as
amicus curiae noted that “principles of antitrust injury and standing” are
“embedded in the FTAIA.”103
95. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1).
96. Id. § 6a(2) (referring to “sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section”)
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1.  “Cartels are ‘the supreme evil of antitrust.’ The fixing of prices,
bids, output, and markets by cartels has no plausible efficiency justification; therefore, anti-
trust authorities properly regard cartel behavior as per se illegal or a ‘hard core’ violation
of the competition laws.”  Barnett, supra note 79, at 1; Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant At-
torney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Priorities: A Year in Review,
Fall Forum of the Section of Antitrust Law 1 (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj
.gov/atr/public/speeches/206455.pdf (noting that “the highest enforcement priority is root-
ing out and prosecuting illegal cartels—naked agreements not to compete”).
98. Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 342.
100. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., No. Civ. 001686TFH, 2001 WL
761360, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2001); Empagran, 315 F.3d at 343.
101. See Empagran, 2001 WL 761360, at *5; Empagran, 315 F.3d at 341.
102. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 8-9, Empagran, 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No.
01-7115), 2005 WL 388672 [hereinafter Government D.C. Cir. Brief].  The district court
dismissed the foreign plaintiffs’ claims “because the conspiracy’s effect on U.S. commerce
did not cause the foreign purchasers’ injury.” Empagran, 315 F.3d at 343.  It based its
holding on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and did not reach defendants’ standing
argument. See id.
103. Government D.C. Cir. Brief, supra note 102, at 8-9.
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A. LITERALIST STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND
WORLDWIDE CONSPIRACY
Plaintiffs advanced two theories why their claims were within a U.S.
antitrust court’s purview.  The first was a reading of the FTAIA that
broadened U.S. courts’ extra territorial scope.  This argument holds that
jurisdiction may be asserted over any claim alleging harm flowing from
antitrust-violative conduct, even if the conduct occurred overseas, so long
as the conduct also had some effect in domestic commerce.  Importantly,
plaintiffs further argued the effect in domestic U.S. commerce need have
no connection to their harm.104
This theory finds primary traction in a literalist interpretation of the
text of the FTAIA.105  Under subsection two of the statute, for extraterri-
torial jurisdiction to be available, the complained-of conduct must have
an appropriate effect on U.S. commerce, and “such effect” must “give[ ]
rise to a claim” under the antitrust laws.106  Defendants argued the con-
duct alleged must give rise to the plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiffs’ argued the
conduct alleged need only give rise to a claim.  It is not difficult to appre-
ciate why the plaintiffs’ proffered interpretation appeared to give proper
effect to Congress’s use in subsection two of the indefinite article “a,”
rather than the definite article “the.”
In the first opinion in the recent wave of extraterritoriality cases to
allow foreign plaintiffs suit to proceed, the Second Circuit in Kruman v.
Christie’s International PLC107 accepted a variation of the broad theory
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  The Kruman court held the conduct com-
plained of need only have violated the substantive provisions of the Sher-
man Act, but need not have caused any harm in U.S. commerce.108  “A
claim” might include a claim brought by the United States, which is not
obliged to demonstrate harm to seek injunctive relief and criminal penal-
ties for violation of the antitrust laws.109
The D.C. Circuit opinion in Empagran was the second to adopt a lib-
eral interpretation of the extent of extraterritorial reach permitted by the
FTAIA.  That court interpreted “a claim” to mean a claim by a private
plaintiff, although like the Second Circuit in Kruman, it need not be
104. Empagran, 315 F.3d at 344 (inquiring whether “it [is] enough for a plaintiff to show
that the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct on U.S. commerce give rise to
an antitrust claim under the Sherman Act by someone, even if not by the plaintiff who is
before the court”).
105. This sort of textual analysis recently has gained traction in antitrust decision-mak-
ing. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173-174 (2004);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-14, Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905), 2005 WL 303 6314.
106. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6(a)(2) (West 2005).
107. Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).  The petition for certi-
orari in Kruman  was dismissed when the case settled.
108. See id. at 399-400; Empagran, 315 F.3d at 348 (discussing the Second Circuit’s
holding in Kruman).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (right of action provision for the United States); Empagran, 542
U.S. at 170-71 (noting the distinction between private plaintiffs and government plaintiffs
is that government plaintiffs need not show standing).
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plaintiff before the court.  Thus, some plaintiff must have suffered harm
in domestic U.S. commerce from the effect of the conduct.110  The foreign
plaintiffs’ claims would then be derivative of that domestic plaintiff’s
claim.
The Empagran plaintiffs’ second theory became the Empagran excep-
tion. Under that theory, if the FTAIA permitted jurisdiction only over
claims caused by an effect on domestic U.S. commerce, plaintiffs’ claims
might nonetheless be cognizable. Plaintiffs argued the defendants had
been engaged in a worldwide price-fixing conspiracy, in which all conduct
was interdependent on all other conduct.111  The court of appeals de-
scribed the interdependence theory as one of a possibility of arbitrage by
third parties purchasing at competitive prices in one location and selling
below the fixed-price level in another or by would-be purchasers in price-
fixed markets purchasing instead in competitive markets and importing to
their home markets.112
The interdependence theory is not new.  In de Atucha v. Commodity
Exchange, Inc.,113 the plaintiff alleged that “because of the fungibility of
silver and silver futures, the United States market . . . and the London
Exchange function from an economic standpoint as a single market.”114
“DeAtucha’s theory of standing, as we understand it, is that he may sue
under American antitrust laws because the defendants’ manipulation of
the American silver markets produced his injury on the [London
Exchange].”115
Economic theory supports an allegation that, in a worldwide conspir-
acy, stable prices in a particular geographic locale are essential to main-
taining stable prices in others.116  Successful cartels only can exist in
environments that permit the members to detect “cheating”—that is,
pricing below the agreed cartel price in an effort to gain market share.117
Cheating in a worldwide cartel could occur if one producer arranged to
110. See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 350.
111. “Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily transporta-
ble, without an adverse domestic effect (in other words, higher prices in the United States),
the sellers could not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangement, and re-
spondents would not have suffered their foreign injury.” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. See
Diamond, supra note 12, at 809 (“With rampant globalization, instantaneous communica-
tion, and multinationals building products with components from all over the world and
selling them far from where they are produced, it may be argued that there no longer are
independent, national markets.”).
112. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113. 608 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
114. Id. at 511-12 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint, ¶ 28).
115. Id. at 513.
116. See Connor, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the likelihood of geographic arbitrage in
the world market for vitamins at issue in Empagran).
117. See BORK, supra note 74, at 102-04 (describing the incentives that make cheating
on cartels likely); Katherine M. McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Economics of Price Fix-
ing, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 139, 143 (Terry Calvani & John Sieg-
fried eds., 2d ed. 1988) (conditions required to stabilize cartels); Levenstein & Suslow,
supra note 3, at 819 n.19 (collecting authorities); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly,
72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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sell to distributors in a non-price-fixed market, enabling those distribu-
tors to move the product to their home markets on their own initiative,
hiding the maverick producer’s low-price sales from its co-conspirators.
Fixing prices in every market in which the cartel members operate is a
sure way to avoid this form of cheating.
The related arbitrage concern, which the D.C. Circuit noted in Em-
pagran, is that even independent of cheating by participants in the cartel,
distributors or third parties could take advantage of lower prices in one
geographic market to move product on their own from a lower-priced,
competitive market to a fixed-price one.118
On the other hand, strong reason exists to believe maintaining a world-
wide conspiracy is sufficiently difficult that localized price-fixing behavior
is much more likely.  The larger the scope of the conspiracy, the more
difficult and expensive should be reaching agreement among cartel mem-
bers as to prices and market shares in the diverse geographic locales
within the scope of the conspiracy and monitoring the behavior of co-
conspirators.119  Additionally, a worldwide conspiracy might involve too
many players with too diverse of interests and corporate cultures to be
maintainable at all.120  Those factors seem at least as likely to undermine
any arguments of global interdependence in a worldwide cartel as the
cheating and arbitrage arguments are to bolster them.121
On the initial appeal from the trial court, the D.C. Circuit did not ad-
dress plaintiffs’ theory of worldwide independence.122  Neither did the
Second Circuit in Kruman inquire into the existence of a causal connec-
tion.123  By contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As
v. HeereMac Vof (“Statoil”),124 did address the causal connection be-
118. A thorough analysis of this effect is found in Connor, supra note 18.
119. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 117, at 146-47 (discussing the difficulties of
fine-tuning fixed prices among participants in a cartel).
120. See id. at 148 (necessity for a sufficiently small number of firms to permit control
of cheating on a price agreement).  One criticism of the foregoing assertions is that geo-
graphic breadth of a cartel is less important than sheer size as far as goes the challenges of
maintaining solidarity among its members.  Research has not uncovered analysis of which
factor—size of cartel/numerosity of participants or geographic breadth—is more impor-
tant.  But surely they are not independent qualities.  A cartel of great geographic scope is
likely to be larger than one that is purely local.  Also, geographic scope does present partic-
ularized challenges.  Those would include some of the same language and culture barriers
that accompany all cross-border business dealings.
121. But see Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 819 (arguing that multinational car-
tels have features, including the presence of many markets in which punishment of devia-
tions can occur, that may make them more cohesive); id. at 806 (discussing a set of
international cartels with a mean duration of just over five years and a median duration of
approximately four years, of which the longest-surviving example, a shipping cartel in Cen-
tral-West Africa, lasted twenty years); Connor, supra note 18, at 7-10 (arguing the vitamins
cartel at issue in Empagran was vast and sophisticated);
122. Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
123. Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399-400 (2d Cir. 2002) (FTAIA re-
lates to conduct, not to the injury; injury is governed by Clayton § 4).
124. 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
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tween domestic effect and foreign injury.125  In Statoil, the plaintiff had
argued that “the market . . . is a single, unified, global market.”126  But
“the FTAIA requires more than a ‘close relationship’ between the do-
mestic injury and the plaintiff’s claim; it demands that the domestic effect
‘gives rise’ to the claim.”127  Because the plaintiffs apparently failed to
plead any causal connection, the court did not have occasion to define
what degree of nexus would be required for a harm felt in domestic U.S.
commerce to confer authority on a U.S. antitrust court to decide a suit
over a derivative foreign harm.
B. REJECTING LITERALISM IN FAVOR OF PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY
The FTAIA precludes the assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts to
remedy wholly foreign harm with no nexus to an effect in U.S. com-
merce.128  Statutory subsection one makes clear the complained-of con-
duct must have had a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect
on domestic commerce, import commerce, or on the business of U.S. ex-
porters.129  Statutory subsection (2) makes clear the conduct’s effect on
domestic U.S. commerce must have given rise to the plaintiff’s claims
under the antitrust laws.130  But holding there is an exception for claims
of foreign harm with a sufficient nexus to the effect on U.S. commerce,
the Empagran Court reversed the lower court on plaintiffs’ literalist the-
ory.131  Plaintiffs must do more than merely allege the defendant’s anti-
trust-violative conduct gave rise to “a” claim under the antitrust laws.
125. Id. at 425 (noting argument that “Statoil’s injury in the North Sea was a ‘necessary
prerequisite to’ and was ‘the quid pro quo for’ the injury suffered in the United States
domestic market”).
126. Id. at 425.
127. Id. at 427.
128. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). Empagran
came to the Supreme Court by way of a split among the Courts of Appeals.  The Fifth
Circuit in Statoil held that U.S. antitrust courts’ jurisdiction did not extend to harm suf-
fered in foreign commerce. Statoil, 214 F.3d at 428.  The Second Circuit in the Christie’s
Auction House litigation, Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002),
reached the opposite conclusion.  The D.C. Circuit in Empagran aligned itself close to
Kruman, holding that the foreign plaintiffs’ claims could be heard in U.S. antitrust courts.
Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
129. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 161-62 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1)).  Section 6(a)(1)
literally requires that conduct is within the purview of a U.S. antitrust court only if
such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect (A)
on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on ex-
port trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in
such trade or commerce in the United States.
130. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2) (2000)).  Section
6(a)(2) literally requires that, once a plaintiff has demonstrated the requisite effect to meet
the first element of the FTAIA, the plaintiff prove also that
such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this
title, other than this section.  If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such
conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to
7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in
the United States.
131. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
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The conduct must have given rise to “the” claim that formed the basis of
their lawsuit.132
Two primary rationales support that interpretation.  First, the principle
of prescriptive comity requires construing ambiguities in the FTAIA “to
avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other na-
tions.”133  Second, the Empagran Court was convinced from a read of the
language and legislative history of the FTAIA that the statute narrowed,
rather than broadened, the scope of extraterritorial application of the
U.S. antitrust laws vis-a-vis the state of the law before its enactment.134
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment only.  They
would have relied solely on the text of the FTAIA, interpreted in the light
of “the principle that statutes should be read in accord with the custom-
ary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within their
own territories”—that is, the prescriptive comity canon135
1. International Comity Ramifications
Under the prescriptive comity rationale, the Court paid exceptional re-
spect to concerns for the possible harm to international comity from U.S.
antitrust courts’ jurisdictional overreaching.  The presence in the litiga-
tion of several foreign government amici figured prominently in the
opinion.136
The emphasis on comity was an about-face from the Court’s opinion
132. Id. at 174.  No confusion exists as to this part of the Court’s holding. See, e.g.,
Sniado v. Bank Austria A.G., 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004), on remand from 542 U.S. 917
(2004), vacating and remanding in light of Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).  In Sniado, the
plaintiffs had not alleged any nexus between a domestic effect of overseas conduct and
their foreign injuries.  The Second Circuit held that in light of Empagran, the complaint
must be dismissed. Id. at 212-13.
133. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)).
On prescriptive comity generally, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
812-22 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).  Under this doctrine, “‘an act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.’” Id. at 814-15 (quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).  “Though it clearly has constitutional authority to
do so, Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-
law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.” Id. at 815. See also generally Pamela Karten Book-
man, Solving the Extraterritoriality Problem:  Lessons from the Honest Services Statute, 92
VA. L. REV. 749, 755-59 (2006) (describing the prescriptive comity doctrine).
134. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169.  The opinion qualified this discussion as helpful “to
those who find legislative history useful.” Id. at 163.  Writing for six Justices, Justice
Breyer appears to be referring in this passage to a concurrence in which Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment by relying solely on the text of the
statute and canons of construction. See id. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally
Max Huffman, Review Essay: Using All Available Information, 25 REV. LITIG. 501, 506
(2006) (noting the regularity with which Justices Breyer and Scalia concur in each other’s
opinions, advancing their own views of the statutory interpretive process).
135. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176.
136. See id. at 167-69 (citing to briefs filed by the governments of Germany, Canada
and Japan).
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eleven years previous in Hartford Fire.137  The Court held in that case, in
an analysis turning on the common-law effects test, that a U.S. court
should exercise jurisdiction over a claim of overseas conspiracies with ef-
fects in U.S. markets.138  “[E]ven assuming that in a proper case a court
may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct
. . ., international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction
in the circumstances alleged here.”139  By contrast, in Empagran, all eight
voting Justices agreed that comity considerations were controlling.  But
the Empagran Court did not explicitly cast doubt on the Hartford Fire
rule.140  What the Court did do was elevate the comity question from an
afterthought in Hartford Fire to a preeminent decision rationale in
Empagran.141
The fulcrum of the prescriptive comity analysis in Empagran was this:
stepping on toes internationally is acceptable to protect domestic com-
merce.  It is not acceptable in order to protect wholly foreign com-
merce.142  The opinion contrasted the case of application of U.S. antitrust
laws to foreign commerce to redress domestic injury with the same over-
seas application to redress foreign injury.143  In each situation, extraterri-
torial antitrust jurisdiction raises comity concerns by “interfer[ing] with a
foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial af-
fairs.”144  In the case of domestic injury, the Court held it is “reasonable”
to apply our laws to regulate the foreign conduct.145  But in the case of
foreign injury, the Court held “the justification for that interference” with
the foreign nation’s regulatory authority “seems insubstantial.”146
137. 509 U.S. 764. See Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 1095, 1101 (discussing Empagran as
evidence of a “renewed interest on the part of the Supreme Court in using principles of
comity to confine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law”).
138. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99.
139. Id.
140. Cf. McBee v. Delica Corp., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005) (relying on both Empagran
and Hartford Fire).
141. Compare Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 1102 (Empagran “signals acceptance of the
notion that comity operates actually to limit the reach of U.S. law to foreign conduct”),
with Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 218 (calling Hartford Fire a “near death blow to comity”);
Diamond, supra note 12, at 814-15 (interpreting Hartford Fire to relegate comity principles
to a circumstance of true conflict between a foreign regime and U.S. law). The importance
of comity concerns in extraterritorial commercial regulation has received significant schol-
arly attention. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 1, at 84 (arguing that comity concerns should
receive more attention, and those concerns raise the question of the location of the social
harm to be remedied).
142. Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 1100 (“the principle of non-interference is not absolute.
Statutes must be construed to prevent unreasonable interference . . . but, as the Court
notes, sometimes interference with foreign sovereign authority is justified”).
143. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). Cf. Ed-
ward D. Cavanagh, The FIAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions
Under the Antitrust Laws: The New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2151,
2159-80 (2003) (listing “concrete factual scenarios in which jurisdictional issues arise”—
combinations of foreign or domestic conduct and foreign or domestic harm).
144. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.
145. Id. at 165. See Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 1103.
146. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.  One commentator, addressing the Empagran Court’s
prescriptive comity analysis, concludes that it foreordained the D.C. Circuit’s holding on
remand.  Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next 58 SMU L. REV.
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Empagran is a definitive modern statement of a rule announced previ-
ously in cases such as Matsushita Electric Industries Corp. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.147 that the policies of the U.S. antitrust scheme support the protec-
tion of U.S. commerce.  Because, as this Article has previously argued,
the prudential standing inquiry exists to ensure private litigation furthers
the policies of the antitrust laws, Empagran should be read to teach that
comity considerations are an analysis that must be injected into the pru-
dential standing inquiry.148
2. Statutory Interpretation
The Court rejected the lower court’s literalist reading of the FTAIA.149
This rejection is surprising because of the apparent ease with which it was
reached.  The literalist interpretation hews closely to the plain language
of the FTAIA.  Section 6(a)(1) permits suit in a U.S. antitrust court if the
complained-of conduct “gives rise to a claim” under the substantive anti-
trust laws.150  The Court adopted the rule advanced by defendants, hold-
ing the conduct must give rise to the claim—that of the plaintiff suing—
rather than just any claim.151  Neither the Court nor the concurrence
made any effort to construe away Congress’s choice of the indefinite arti-
cle “a,”  noting respondents’ “linguistic logic.”152  It acknowledged “re-
spondents’ linguistic arguments might show that respondents’ reading is
the more natural reading of the statutory language.”153  In concurrence,
1419, 1437 (2005).  According to this argument, when the D.C. Circuit analyzed plaintiffs’
claims under the Empagran exception, it was required to hold no subject-matter jurisdic-
tion exists because of comity concerns. Id. at 1434.  That analysis overlooks two things: (1)
the Court’s use of the word “reasonable” to describe the degree of interference with for-
eign nations’ sovereign authority over matters implicating their own domestic commerce
(Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165-66), and (2) the continuing vitality of the Court’s decision in
Hartford Fire. Far from condemning all efforts to bring claims of harm in foreign com-
merce in U.S. antitrust courts, one can infer from Empagran a weighing of the degree of
impingement on foreign sovereignty against the interests of the United States in the en-
forcement of its laws. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165 (“application of our antitrust laws to
foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with prin-
ciples of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic
antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused”).  The latter is a question
of the degree to which the harm plaintiffs allege reflects an effect on U.S. commerce.
147. 475 U.S. 514 (1986),
148. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
149. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-75.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2) (2005). See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the FTAIA).  The literalist reading had convinced six of nine federal court of appeals
judges to consider it.  See Empagran, 315 F.3d 338; Kruman v. Christie’s, 284 F.3d 384 (2d
Cir. 2002); Der Norske Stats Oljeselskep As v. Heeramac VOF, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
151. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-75.
152. Id. at 174.
153. Id.  The majority was comfortable that notions of prescriptive comity overcame the
statute’s plain language. Id. at 175 (majority opinion). Again, an argument has been made
that this reasoning precluded a decision for the plaintiffs on remand.  “Clearly, plaintiffs’
alternative theory”—what this article has termed their theory of worldwide interdepen-
dence—“would expand antitrust jurisdiction, since they have cited no decisions that upheld
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign transactions on their . . . theory before the FTAIA’s
enactment.”  Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1434.  That analysis ignores the story of extra-
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Justice Scalia—famous for his “textualist” statutory interpretive philoso-
phy154—“concur[red] in the judgment of the Court because the language
of the statute is readily susceptible to the interpretation the Court
provides.”155
C. WHAT THE FTAIA DOES NOT DO
The statute, as interpreted in Empagran, does not establish a bright-
line rule prohibiting suits by foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign com-
merce.156  The Empagran Court declined to address plaintiffs’ worldwide
conspiracy argument:
We have assumed that the anticompetitive conduct here indepen-
dently caused foreign injury; that is, the conduct’s domestic effects
did not help to bring about that foreign injury. . . .  Respondents
contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily transporta-
ble, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the
United States), the sellers could not have maintained their interna-
tional price-fixing arrangement and respondents would not have suf-
fered their foreign injury. . . .
The Court of Appeals, however, did not address this argument . . .,
and, for that reason, neither shall we.157
The avenue of argument that the Court left for plaintiffs to allege their
harm in foreign commerce was caused by the effects of the defendant’s
conduct in U.S. commerce is the Empagran exception.  And the Court
explicitly declined to define its contours.158
The Court’s approach in Empagran can be likened to the creation of a
per se rule at substantive antitrust law.  When circumstances—in this case,
territoriality of commerce, remarked numerous times by courts and commentators, over
the decades since the FTAIA was enacted in 1982.  Increasing interdependence of world
markets increases the likelihood that a foreign harm will flow from a domestic effect.  The
fact that plaintiffs prior to 1982 had been unsuccessful making those allegations does little
to inform the likelihood of success of that argument on remand in Empagran II, and even
less to inform the likelihood of success of that argument under the Empagran exception
going forward.
154. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). See also Huffman, supra note 134.
155. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia was swayed by
principles of “deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within their own terri-
tories.” Id.
156. Id. at 175.
157. Id.
Throughout the opinion the Court took great pains to make clear that it “base[d] our
decision” on the assumption that “the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse
domestic effect.” Id.  (This caveat was repeated many times in some form or another in the
opinion.) See, e.g., id. at 165 (“Why is it reasonable to apply this law to conduct that is
significantly foreign insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that for-
eign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim?”).
158. See In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL
1080790, at *1 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005) (“The Empagran Court expressly declined to ad-
dress the issue presented in this case: whether subject matter jurisdiction exists when a
plaintiff’s foreign injury is allegedly linked to the domestic effects of the allegedly anti-
competitive conduct.”).
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the “insubstantial” nature of any arguments supporting interference in
foreign sovereigns’ right to regulate their own markets—demonstrate
that no grounds exist on which extraterritorial application would be ap-
propriate, the Court was willing to preclude inquiry on the question in
future cases.159  But in the greater range of cases, judicial experience is
not sufficiently complete to permit a conclusion that extraterritorial ap-
plication is per se inappropriate.160  Those cases remain subject to the
Empagran exception—a modern extraterritorial rule of reason.161
The flexible rule in Empagran recognized that the state of multina-
tional commerce has not remained constant since the FTAIA was enacted
in 1982.  It will continue to develop going forward.  A rule imposing an
inflexible approach as to the geographic scope of courts’ extraterritorial
reach would not accommodate changing circumstances.162  In the Em-
pagran exception, the Court permitted ongoing analysis of the kinds of
harms cognizable under U.S. antitrust laws.163
D. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN EMPAGRAN
Questions remain on what procedural ground the Empagran Court
found fault with the lower court’s analysis.  Three possibilities include
subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and prudential stand-
ing.  The Seventh Circuit held prior to Empagran the FTAIA analysis is
not an element of the substantive offense,164 and the Empagran Court did
159. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 117-18 (describing circumstances justifying the
imposition of per se rules under the substantive law).
160. Cf. id. at 118 (noting that the creation of a per se rule is a judgment that requires
sufficient prior experience).  Professor Hovenkamp argues that antitrust law does better
with fewer per se rules. Id. at 308.
161. Cf. Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 2154 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Timberlane as creating a “jurisdictional rule of reason”). But see Empagran, 542 U.S. at
168 (noting in dictum courts should not evaluate extraterritoriality considerations case-by-
case); Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 2154 (same); Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 221 (same).
162. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 116-20 (describing the problems produced by the
doctrine of stare decisis and the antitrust per se rule).  “Stare decisis has effectively created
a ratchet for the per se rule, permitting courts to move in one direction but not the other.”
Id. at 118.
163. In fact, decisions since Empagran have held allegations of worldwide interdepen-
dence sufficient to meet the Empagran exception and to survive motions to dismiss. See
infra notes 193-226 and accompanying text.  Courts before Empagran had only rarely been
faced with allegations of a truly interdependent worldwide cartel. See Connor, supra note
18, at 7-17 (arguing the vitamins cartel was sui generis); JOHN M. CONNOR, PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL CARTELS: EFFECTIVENESS, WELFARE, AND ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT 1
(2003) (“The international cartels discovered and prosecuted since 1995 are qualitatively
different from those operating during the interwar period.  They are truly global cartels
and as such represent the ultimate stage in the evolution of the cartel as a form of business
enterprise.”) [hereinafter PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS]. Empagran made explicit
that no reason exists why sufficient allegations of worldwide interdependence could not
permit a suit alleging foreign harm to proceed. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-75.  And eco-
nomic theory, discussed above, supports those holdings. See supra notes 106-08 and ac-
companying text. But see eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C02-1611 PJH,
2005 WL 1712084 (N.D. Ca. July 20, 2005) (substantial allegations of worldwide interde-
pendence held insufficient).
164. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 950 (7th Cir.
2003).
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nothing to disturb that holding or other lower-court holdings on which it
relied—so Civil Rule 12(b)(6) does not explain the Empagran result.165
According to one commentator: “Strangely enough, in a case that is gen-
erally discussed as being about subject matter jurisdiction, Justice Breyer
used the term only once, and that was in quoting a treatise.”166  The bet-
ter understanding of Empagran is that it is a recognition of the role of the
prudential standing analysis in interpreting the FTAIA.
The Empagran Court did not mention, let alone discuss or decide, the
standing arguments decided by the D.C. Circuit, discussed by other courts
and commentators, pressed by the parties and amici, and which this Arti-
cle contends best explain the result.  The reasons for that failure are un-
clear.167  The standing analysis was ripe for decision in Empagran.  The
question had been addressed (and the standing argument rejected) by the
court of appeals below.168  It had been fully briefed by the parties and
amici and was the subject of argument by the United States as amicus.169
Nonetheless, good reason exists to understand Justice Breyer’s opinion in
Empagran as following the antitrust standing rationale.170
165. See Huffman, supra note 8.
166. Diamond, supra note 12, at 840 (arguing the opinion might be read as relying on a
12(b)(6) standard).
167. The opinion’s author, Justice Breyer, has been called the Court’s primary antitrust
thinker. See Huffman, supra note 134, at 514 n.49.  Certainly he was able to follow the
antitrust standing argument and apply it if he preferred.  Other Members of the Empagran
Court had written important opinions in standing cases. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 520, 555 (1983); Blue
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 493
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 357-59 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
169. At oral argument by the government amici in support of petitioners, the standing
argument received a somewhat ignominious reception.  Then-acting Assistant Attorney
General R. Hewitt Pate argued, “with respect to the foreign-incurred injuries, [the foreign
plaintiff] must show injury by reason of that which makes the conduct illegal, and since
Alcoa in [1945], and certainly under Hartford, it is the effect on U.S. commerce that make
the conduct the concern of the Sherman Act.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Em-
pagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416 (1945); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)). See also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(No. 03-724); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and Organization
for International Investment as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S.
155 (2004) (No. 03-724).  Justice Stevens—the author of Associated Gen. Contractors, 459
U.S. 519 (1983), and an important dissent in Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
493 (1982)—queried in response: “I don’t follow the [argument].”  Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 19, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
170. One commentator has suggested that the failure to rely on standing as a decision
rationale reflects a desire to let the issue percolate further before it becomes the basis for
decision.  Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1431.  That explanation is misguided for two rea-
sons.  First, the antitrust injury doctrine was established in Brunswick without significant
underlying percolation in the courts of appeals.  The primary discussion of antitrust stand-
ing as a decision principle had come from an article the year before by Professor Areeda.
Areeda, supra note 22, at 1130-36.  By contrast, when Empagran was decided, not only was
antitrust standing doctrine well established, its application in the extraterritoriality frame-
work had been analyzed by lower courts, including the D.C. Circuit in Empagran, and by
noted commentators. See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 357-59; Der Norske Stats Oljeselskep As
v. Heeramac VOF, 241 F.3d 420, 431 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001); deAtucha v. Commodity Ex-
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The failure to address standing reflects the narrowness of the Court’s
opinion.  Foreign harm with no connection to an effect on U.S. com-
merce—the only explicit application of the opinion—does not raise diffi-
cult prudential issues.  The Court had no need to rely on a prudential
doctrine.  That standing doctrine underlies Empagran is made clear by a
structural analysis of the FTAIA and by examining three features of the
Court’s opinion interpreting the statute.
1. The FTAIA Preserved the Standing Doctrine
The Second Circuit in Kruman noted the essential distinction between
the substantive provisions of the U.S. antitrust scheme—what the FTAIA
refers to as “sections 1 to 7 of this title”171—and the right of action provi-
sions, which include Clayton 4, the basis for the antitrust standing in-
quiry.172  Although it held the FTAIA permitted jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ claims, the Second Circuit’s careful analysis of the structure of
the U.S. antitrust laws and its broad extraterritoriality holding did noth-
ing to prejudice defendants’ abilities to argue a lack of standing in that
case.173
change, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 1 WALLER, supra note 84, § 9.7 (noting the
relevance of standing issues in the FTAIA context); Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 2187-88.
Second, the Court regularly signals its refusal to decide an issue not decided by the courts
below—in fact, it refused to define the scope of the Empagran exception, preferring to let
the D.C. Circuit decide that issue first—but it did not do so with regard to standing. See
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. See also, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991,
1999 (2006) (“We decline to consider Ideal’s § 1962(a) claim without the benefit of the
Court of Appeals’ analysis . . . .”).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).
172. Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 2175.  This distinction was lost on the D.C. Circuit in
Empagran.
173. Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002) (remanding to the
trial court to decide the standing issue in the first instance).  Determining what might have
happened in Kruman on remand may be a process of reading tea leaves, but there is ample
indication in the district court’s opinion that it would have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on
remand on the grounds of antitrust standing.  Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of
New York observed the distinction on which the Second Circuit relied between illegal con-
duct and the private right to a remedy:
[I]t is perfectly appropriate for the United States to punish the conspiracy—
the formation and continuation of the illicit agreement—because it took
place in substantial part in this country . . . .  But it would be appropriate for
the United States to provide remedies for injuries suffered in consequence of
overt acts that occurred outside this country only if those acts, either individ-
ually or perhaps collectively, had direct, substantial and reasonably foresee-
able effects here that caused the injuries to be remedied.
Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Judge Kaplan
also cited provisions in the legislative history of the FTAIA demonstrating the concern for
the location of the particular plaintiffs’ injuries and the nexus between the effect and the
injury. Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 624-25 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 7-8 (1982)).
Judge Kaplan surely would not have taken long on remand to discover in that same legisla-
tive history the express intent to preserve the doctrines of antitrust standing and antitrust
injury. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 11 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2496 (“Conduct which has an anticompetitive effect which impinges only on defendants
[plaintiffs] located in foreign nations and which has a neutral or procompetitive domestic
effect” does not give rise to standing under the antitrust laws.).
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The Kruman analysis is a highly defensible interpretation of the
FTAIA in light of a broader understanding of the U.S. antitrust scheme.
The Kruman court understood the FTAIA as a jurisdictional provision
that spoke to the type of conduct forbidden—conduct that violates the
U.S. antitrust laws—rather than to the type of plaintiff that may bring suit
to remedy harm caused by that conduct, a question answered by Clayton
4.174  That understanding of the FTAIA relies on a separation in the U.S.
antitrust scheme between the substantive, jurisdictional provisions and
the right of action provision contained in Clayton 4.175  Under the
Kruman approach, factors to be considered in the extraterritoriality anal-
ysis are part of a private plaintiff’s standing argument under Clayton 4—
an approach reminiscent of the Third Circuit’s pre-FTAIA decision in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.176
Other courts in modern FTAIA litigation have ignored the careful dis-
tinction in the antitrust laws between the conduct standards and the pri-
vate right of action provision, specifically rejecting arguments that the
schemes should be treated separately.177  For example, the lower court in
Empagran treated the FTAIA as a hybrid provision that spoke to both
the type of conduct over which suit is cognizable and the type of plaintiff
that is permitted to sue.178
Two strong arguments refute the hybrid approach to the FTAIA.  First,
the FTAIA gives no indication, in its text or in its legislative history, of
any intent to supplant the body of antitrust standing doctrine that has
grown up around interpretations of Clayton 4.179  The legislative history
explicitly recognized the preservation of “existing concepts of antitrust
injury or antitrust standing.”180  Second, the FTAIA applies equally in
174. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399-400.
175. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
176. See generally Huffman, supra note 8.
177. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350-51 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (calling the structural argument “plausible but ultimately unconvincing”).
178. See id. at 358 (satisfying FTAIA implies plaintiffs were the appropriate plaintiffs to
bring suit).
The FTAIA does contain a bare glimmer of support for that interpretation in its explicit
textual reference to the type of exporter plaintiff that must suffer harm to permit extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction: “sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury
to export business in the United States.”  15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).  But that textual support,
at most, is a limitation on standing applicable only to a narrow class of exporter plaintiffs.
It cannot support reading the FTAIA to address the antitrust standing inquiry more
broadly.  Under the expressio unius et exclusio alterius canon of construction, the explicit
reference to exporter plaintiffs is evidence that the FTAIA does not address the standing
inquiry for other plaintiffs.
179. See Memorandum from the Antitrust Modernization Comm. to All Comm’rs, Sup-
plemental International Antitrust Discussion Memorandum—FTAIA Issue 5 (July 21,
2006), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/Intl-FTAIASuppMemo060721circ.pdf
(“The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to alter the issue of plain-
tiffs’ standing.”). Cf. de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 517 n.20
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding the FTAIA “not applicable to the instant action (because it re-
lates to jurisdiction, not standing)”).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 11 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496.
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actions brought by the government.181  This is so although the antitrust
enforcement agencies are not required to establish standing to bring suit
over substantive antitrust violations.182  If satisfying the FTAIA precludes
a standing analysis, the statutory inquiry resolves the standing question
even for those government plaintiffs that need not establish standing.
The opposite side of the same coin is that the extraterritoriality analysis
under the FTAIA is redundant to an analysis under Clayton 4, violating
the principle that statutes should be construed to avoid redundancy.183
The better understanding is that the FTAIA speaks to conduct of con-
cern, and Clayton 4 governs all aspects of a private plaintiff’s right to sue.
2. Standing Decision Principles Control the FTAIA Analysis
Three features of the Empagran Court’s interpretation of the FTAIA
justify reading it as a standing opinion, interpreting the private plaintiff’s
right to sue under Clayton 4, even if couched as a jurisdictional holding
under the FTAIA.184  First, the Court relied on California v. American
Stores Co.185 to support the conclusion that cases involving the United
States as a plaintiff do not inform the extraterritoriality analysis for pri-
vate plaintiffs.  Second, the Court emphasized doctrine, including comity
considerations and the first-principles deterrence rationales, that are best
suited to a malleable standing analysis.  Third, the Court failed to over-
rule Hartford Fire.186
181. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS §§ 3.12, 3.121 (Apr. 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internet.htm (“To the extent that conduct in for-
eign countries does not ‘involve’ import commerce but does have an ‘effect’ on either im-
port transactions or commerce within the United States, the Agencies apply the ‘direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable’ standard of the FTAIA.”).
182. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (granting to the Department of Justice power to enforce
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act). See also F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Em-
pagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 170-71 (2004).
183. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 256 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
184. This explanation is similar to the treatment given to standing doctrine in briefing
by the United States as amicus in Empagran.  The United States argued that the standing
question was subsumed into the FTAIA. See Government D.C. Cir. Brief, supra note 102.
185. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
186. One implication of this interpretation is that Justice Scalia in concurrence, who
had dissented from the Court’s failure to recognize comity limitations on the extraterrito-
rial reach of the antitrust laws in Hartford Fire, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 817-20 (1993), misunderstood the actual import of the majority’s Empagran opin-
ion.  After his vigorous dissent in Hartford Fire, it is unlikely that a decision in line with the
Hartford Fire approach of treating comity as a prudential matter—what this Article argues
is placing the comity concern into the standing framework—would command a concur-
rence in any of its reasoning by Justice Scalia. Id.  It is possible that treating what is essen-
tially a standing analysis as a matter of interpretation informed by notions of prescriptive
comity might have been a political compromise to avoid a fractured opinion like that in
Hartford Fire.
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a. Public Versus Private Enforcement
The distinction between public and private enforcement and the cita-
tion to American Stores make sense in a standing analysis.  They do not
make sense in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction.  As the Ameri-
can Stores Court noted, private plaintiffs “must have standing . . . in order
to obtain relief.”187  But “[i]n a Government case the proof of the viola-
tion of law may itself establish sufficient public injury to warrant re-
lief.”188  This authority distinguished Timken Roller Bearing Co., National
Lead Co., and American Tobacco Co.,189 all pre-FTAIA examples of ex-
traterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws.190  Because those
cases were brought by the United States, not by private plaintiffs, they
did not speak to the standards for extraterritoriality in private litigation.
The FTAIA itself does not support that conclusion.  The statute makes
no distinction between public and private plaintiffs.191  It applies whether
the suit is one by the government as a regulator or a private plaintiff
seeking compensation for harm suffered as a market participant.  In fact,
the FTAIA has a direct analog in the FTC Act, which has no private right
of action like Clayton 4.192  There also is no distinction between public
enforcement and private enforcement in the substantive definition of an
antitrust claim.193  The American Stores distinction between public and
private enforcement is relevant because only the private plaintiff finds its
right of action in Clayton 4 and must establish standing to sue.  Invoking
the public/private distinction, and American Stores, demonstrates reliance
on a prudential standing inquiry.
More, the Empagran Court noted different incentives between private
plaintiffs and government plaintiffs.194  This reflects an invocation of the
optimization goals that this Article has argued are embedded in the pru-
dential standing inquiry.195  The FTAIA, by contrast, does not provide a
warrant for considering the differential incentives among different classes
of litigants invoking its language.
b. Reliance on Previously Unsung Rationales
Reliance on comity concerns and deterrence rationales as decision
principles makes more sense in a standing analysis.  One court recently
has
187. American Stores, 495 U.S. at 296 (discussing standing in the context of the private
injunctive remedy under Clayton Act § 16).
188. Id. at 295.
189. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911).
190. F. Hoffman-La Roche LTD v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 170 (2004).
191. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3).
193. Id.
194. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171 (citing Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and
EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 194 (1999)).
195. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
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reject[ed] the notion that a comity analysis is part of subject matter
jurisdiction.  Comity considerations . . . are properly treated as ques-
tions of whether a court should, in its discretion, decline to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction that it already possesses.  Our approach to
each of these issues is in harmony with the analogous rules for extra-
territorial application of the antitrust laws.196
That approach, taken by the First Circuit in McBee v. Delica Corp., is
highly reminiscent of the Third Circuit’s Mannington Mills decision.197
The same is true for first-principles deterrence rationales.  Comity and
deterrence are not grounded anywhere in the text of the antitrust laws,
and, in particular, are not found in the text of the FTAIA.  Congress left
to the courts the question whether and how to invoke deterrence princi-
ples.  In particular, the inverse deterrence argument, which received
much attention in Empagran, did not exist when the FTAIA was enacted
in 1982.  The amnesty program on which it is based has been in existence
only since 1993.198
The prudential standing inquiry is an inquiry in which the common law
always has been employed to advance the doctrine.199  It is an inquiry
that permits courts to address principles not set down by Congress in stat-
utory text when those principles inform the question what plaintiff is an
efficient vindicator of the purposes of the antitrust laws.  Reliance on ex-
tra-statutory principles governing entitlement to suit is best understood as
reliance on standing doctrine.
A contrary explanation might be that prescriptive comity principles
speak to interpretations of the antitrust laws, including the FTAIA.  That
is the most reasonable understanding of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Empagran.  Of course, that explanation says nothing about the emphasis
on deterrence concerns, which is not supportable as a technique of inter-
pretation.  Reliance on deterrence principles can be justified only by
looking outside the text of the FTAIA.  Also, prescriptive comity doc-
trine is not a tool for parsing statutory language.  It speaks generally to
the need to interpret statutes to avoid offending foreign sovereign au-
thority.  A principled approach to interpretation could respect prescrip-
tive comity doctrine while placing the comity concern in the appropriate
box in the statutory scheme.  That box is Clayton 4, not the FTAIA.
196. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (referring to Hartford Fire
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)).
197. Compare id. with Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1979).
198. See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 80.
199. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 514, 533 (1983) (“Congress simply assumed that antitrust damages litigation
would be subject to constraints comparable to well-accepted common-law rules applied in
comparable litigation”); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (compar-
ing standing doctrine to common-law tort causation). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a
Rachet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 706 (1982) (noting that the antitrust laws
are interpreted in the nature of common law analysis).
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c. Reconciling Hartford Fire
The coexistence of the rule in Hartford Fire with the broader definition
of the comity consideration announced in Empagran is further evidence
the Empagran Court relied on a prudential standing inquiry. Hartford
Fire defined the comity consideration narrowly as a subject-matter juris-
diction question.200  After Hartford Fire, commentators and courts gener-
ally understood comity concerns to preclude a finding of subject-matter
jurisdiction only in the case of a direct conflict between the foreign sover-
eign’s laws and the laws of the United States.
Empagran was an about-face on the comity rationale.  The about-face
can be justified by reference to standing principles, which explanation
also reconciles Empagran with Hartford Fire. Hartford Fire stated a nar-
row comity analysis for subject-matter jurisdiction purposes, explicitly
leaving for another day the prudential question.201 Empagran broadened
the Hartford Fire approach to the comity principle—this time, as a pru-
dential matter.
IV. PRUDENTIAL STANDING ANALYSIS DEFINES THE
EMPAGRAN EXCEPTION
Courts interpreting the FTAIA since Empagran have treated the Em-
pagran exception as a question of the degree of nexus between the effect
on domestic U.S. commerce alleged and the harm suffered by the plaintiff
in foreign commerce.  According to the D.C. Circuit on remand, in Em-
pagran II—a decision that has emerged as the leading authority on the
Empagran exception—a plaintiff with a foreign harm may sue in a U.S.
antitrust court if a domestic effect of the conduct proximately caused the
foreign harm.202 The simple proximate cause analysis, though, is notori-
ously slippery.203  Lacking a clear statement of decision principles, the
Empagran exception has produced as much confusion as existed prior to
Empagran.204  The correct approach is to apply a modified prudential
standing inquiry, which will account for all the Associated General Con-
200. As the First Circuit recently has noted,
[t]he Hartford Fire Court also held that comity considerations, such as
whether relief ordered by an American court would conflict with foreign law,
were properly understood not as questions of whether a United States court
possessed subject matter jurisdiction, but instead as issues of whether such a
court should decline to exercise jurisdiction that it already possessed.
McBee, 417 F.3d at 120 (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797-98 & n.24); id. at 121 (“comity
considerations are properly analyzed not as questions of whether there is subject matter
jurisdiction, but as prudential questions of whether that jurisdiction should be exercised”).
201. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (“We have no need in this litigation to address other
considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on
grounds of international comity.”).
202. Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
203. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 477-78 (noting the indefiniteness of the proximate cause
inquiry). See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928); id. at
101 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
204. See 2 WALLER, supra note 19, § 13.23 (noting that questions remain open after
Empagran and the exception is being tested in a wave of new litigation).
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tractors factors—including the proximate cause question imbedded in
those factors—and permit consideration of concerns for comity and
deterrence.205
A. THE INDETERMINACY OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
On remand in Empagran II, the lower court defined the Empagran ex-
ception as a proximate cause analysis.206  It noted the language of the
FTAIA required that an effect on U.S. commerce “give rise to” a claim.
That language “indicates a direct causal relationship, that is, proximate
causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for ‘nexus’ the appellants
advanced.”207  Initially, why “gives rise to” equates to proximate cause is
not clear.  The court cited no authority for that proposition, which the
plaintiffs had conceded.208
The Empagran II court’s proximate cause analysis would be difficult to
replicate reliably.  Applying that standard, the court held the plaintiffs’
world-wide conspiracy argument, supported by the co-conspirators’ arbi-
trage concerns, “demonstrates at most but-for causation.”209  The causal
connection apparently was not proximate because two sets of fixed prices
were involved—the fixed prices in domestic U.S. commerce that facili-
tated price-fixing in foreign commerce, and the fixed prices in foreign
commerce that actually, directly, caused the plaintiffs’ injury.210  But the
distinction is not so neat as the D.C. Circuit believed.  The distinction
relies on a set of interdependent, but separable, geographic markets.  It is
not supportable if purchasers actually treat regional markets as inter-
changeable.  Apart from saying so, it is not clear what about the world-
wide price-fixing scheme in Empagran led to an indirect and merely but-
205. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 514, 532, 537-40 (1983) (considering proximate cause as an element of the stand-
ing inquiry).
206. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271 (“The statutory language—‘gives rise to’—indicates
a direct causal relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere
but-for ‘nexus’ the appellants advanced in their brief.”)
In OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe International, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), the district court considered a complaint seeking to apply the RICO statute extrater-
ritorially.  Despite the absence from the RICO scheme of a statute like the FTAIA, the
court relied on the effects test from the antitrust scheme to hold that the U.S. effect of
conduct must “directly cause[ ]” a foreign plaintiff’s loss for the law to apply extraterritori-
ally. Id. at 367.
207. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271.
208. Id. at 1270-71 (“the statutory language—‘gives rise to’—indicates a direct causal
relationship, that is, proximate causation”); id. at 1270 (plaintiffs’ concession).  In fact, the
FTAIA contains a textual clue that “gives rise to” does not imply the kind of directness
requirement the D.C. Circuit, since followed by a handful of district courts, saw fit to im-
pose.  The first element of the FTAIA analysis requires a demonstration that conduct have
a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce, import
commerce, or certain types of export commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (2000). See supra
notes 76-91 and accompanying text (analysis of the FTAIA).  But the second element re-
quires only that the effect “gives rise to a claim” under the antitrust laws.  15 U.S.C.
§ 6(a)(2).  The statute lacks any requirement of a direct relationship between the effect and
the plaintiff’s claim.
209. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271.
210. Id.
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for, rather than a direct and proximate, causal nexus.211
The only other federal court of appeals to interpret Empagran, the
Eighth Circuit in In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, fol-
lowed the Empagran II court’s lead.212 It affirmed the lower court’s hold-
ing that allegations of a worldwide conspiracy are not sufficient to make
out the Empagran exception.213  Like the D.C. Circuit in Empagran II,
the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in In re MSG reads like an application of a
per se rule of nonextraterritoriality.  It merely held allegations of a world-
wide conspiracy did not rise to the lead of allegations of a proximate
causal connection to a domestic effect.214  The court gave no indication
that some form of allegation might suffice to make out the Empagran
exception.
Other courts have engaged in similarly indeterminate analyses of proxi-
mate versus but-for causation.  A magistrate judge in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel
Chemicals B.V., held that plaintiffs’ claims did not meet the Empagran
exception.215  In that case, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the application of
the proximate causation rule.216  Interestingly, the court—citing Associ-
ated General Contractors and Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready—grounded
its proximate cause standard in “antitrust principles requiring that an an-
titrust injury-in-fact be caused directly by a defendant’s conduct”217—
thus, antitrust standing principles.  The Latino-Quimica-Amtex court de-
nied plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to include allegations, sup-
ported by an economic expert, of a worldwide ripple effect of price-fixing
in U.S. commerce.218  Like Empagran II, it did what the Supreme Court
211. A second problem with the Empagran II court’s analysis is that it fails to apply the
comity and deterrence principles that underlie the Supreme Court’s analysis of the FTAIA.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 126
S. Ct. 1043 (2006).
212. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., Nos. 05-4303 and 05-4307, slip op. 6,
7 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2007).
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id. at 7-8.
215. Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A.V. Akzo Nibel Chems. B.V., No. 03 Civ. 10312
(HBDF), 2005 WL 2207017 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005).  Plaintiffs had alleged that “‘unlawful
price fixing and market allocation conduct had adverse effects in the United States and in
other nations that caused injury to Plaintiffs in connection with their foreign MCAA
purchases.’” Id. at *9.  Other allegations stated that “‘Defendants[’] and their co-conspira-
tors’ illegal contract, combination and conspiracy to harm U.S. and world commerce di-
rectly injured Plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting the complaint). See also In re Dynamic Random
Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. C02-1486 PJH, 2006 WL 515629, at *4
(N.D. Cal. March 1, 2006) (holding that allegations of a worldwide conspiracy “[w]ithout
more . . . constitute no more than the ‘but-for’ causation that the Empagran cases find
objectionable”).
216. Latino Quimica-Amtex, 2005 WL 2207017, at *8.
217. Id. (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982), and Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532-34
(1983)).
218. Id. at *13.  The magistrate judge held plaintiffs’ alleged “causal link . . . [was] sim-
ply too indirect to support” a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *12-*13 (citing
Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005); MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
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in Empagran had refused to do, and held foreign harm was per se not
cognizable in a U.S. court.
One case dismissing for failure to meet the Empagran exception shows
how difficult—perhaps impossible—it will be for foreign plaintiffs to
meet the proximate cause standard once a court has determined it ap-
plies.  In eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., the court dismissed
claims also relying on arbitrage allegations in a worldwide conspiracy.219
“They contend that if defendants’ conspiracy had not inflated U.S. prices,
the foreign plaintiffs would not have been injured because lower Ameri-
can prices would have driven down international prices overall, including
through arbitrage . . . .”220  The plaintiffs in eMag Solutions made an addi-
tional allegation that should have involved the interchangeability circum-
stance.  The eMag Solutions plaintiffs specifically alleged they were
prepared to engage in arbitrage to end-run fixed prices, but fixed prices in
domestic U.S. commerce prevented their doing so.221
The district court nonetheless held the foreign plaintiffs had not alleged
a proximate causal connection.222  It is difficult to imagine what more the
eMag Solutions plaintiffs could have done to allege the U.S. effect was
the proximate cause of their foreign harm. eMag Solutions may be a
demonstration that the Empagran exception, if defined by proximate
cause, is illusory.223  If so, Empagran would be read to have stated a per
se rule of no extraterritorial application.
The District of Delaware in In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust
Litigation dismissed claims by a U.S. plaintiff claiming harm from con-
duct in foreign commerce.224  Like the claims rejected in Empagran II
and In re MSG, the plaintiffs in In re Intel Corp. argued they were victims
of a worldwide scheme with harm in foreign commerce interdependent
with effects felt in domestic commerce.225  The In re Intel Corp. allega-
tions are distinguishable from the allegations in other recent FTAIA
cases of worldwide cartel activity.  The unilateral conduct in In re Intel
Corp. does not present the “cheating” and “arbitrage” scenarios that sup-
329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2004); In re Monosodium Glutemate Antitrust Litig., No.
Civ. 00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005)).
The Latino Quimica-Amtex court held that “nothing in these allegations even suggests
that Plaintiffs’ injuries were directly, or proximately, caused by the domestic effect of De-
fendants’ alleged conspiracy.” Id. at *9.
219. eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL 1712084,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2005).
220. Id. at *5.
221. Plaintiffs “‘would have been particularly well-suited to replace purchases . . . in
purely foreign commerce with purchases . . . in American commerce, if the conspiracy had
not affected the prices . . . in American commerce.” Id. at *4 (quoting the third-amended
complaint).
222. Id. at *11.
223. eMag lends support to Professor Cavanagh’s conclusion that the Supreme Court in
Empagran left the D.C. Circuit on remand no choice but to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.
See Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1437.
224. 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 556 (D. Del. 2006).
225. Id. at 559.
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port a finding of a nexus between a U.S. effect and a foreign harm.226
In contrast those decisions, a district court in Connecticut held that al-
legations raising the same arbitrage concern as the worldwide conspiracy
allegations in Empagran were sufficient to meet the Empagran excep-
tion.227  Plaintiffs alleged the defendants sought to “ensure that prices
charged by the plaintiffs to end-users in India for products would not
cause erosion to prices . . . in the United States.”228  There is no apparent
legally significant distinction between the allegations the District of Con-
necticut rejected and the allegations held elsewhere not to meet the Em-
pagran exception.229
A district court in Minnesota initially interpreted the Empagran excep-
tion consistently with the District of Connecticut.230  Foreign plaintiffs’
allegations of a worldwide conspiracy to fix the prices of fungible, glob-
ally marketed products survived a motion to dismiss.231  But demonstrat-
ing the confusion that reigns since Empagran, the Minnesota court
reconsidered its holding.232  It was “persuaded by the decision and rea-
soning of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals” in Em-
pagran II.233  The court held on reconsideration, in an opinion affirmed
by the Eighth Circuit in In re MSG, a worldwide conspiracy allegation
established at best but-for, not proximate, cause and that Empagran re-
quired the latter.234
226. See id. at 560 (relying on harm to “a rival’s U.S. competitive potential from over-
seas injury to support the interdependedness argument).
227. MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 338 (D. Conn.
2004).
228. Id. at 340 (quoting the amended complaint).
229. The only identifiable difference between the allegations in MM Global and the
reasoning in Empagran is that the MM Global plaintiffs alleged that “‘[a]s a direct and
proximate result’” of the defendant’s conduct, harm was felt. Id. at 342 (quoting the com-
plaint).  An allegation that something was the proximate cause is an allegation of a legal
conclusion, not of fact. See Latino Quimica-Amtex v. S.A.V. Akzo Nibel Chems. B.V., No.
03 Civ. 10312 (HBOF), 2005 WL 2207017, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (“[w]ithout the
factual predicate to support these allegations, however, they cannot be read to plead the
requisite causal link between the conspiracy’s domestic effect and Plaintiffs’ foreign
claim”).  But the proximate cause allegations in MM Global did not relate to a connection
between an effect on U.S. commerce and harm in India, as most courts’ understanding of
the Empagran exception requires.  The complaint alleged merely that the harm felt in In-
dia was “‘the result of such effect on competition’” in the United States. MM Global, 329
F. Supp. 2d at 342 (quoting the complaint). But see eMag Solutions, 2005 WL 1712084, at
*7 (“the district court in MM Global never discussed whether ‘but-for’ causation is the
appropriate standard” and noting that “the case did not concern ‘purely foreign’
commerce”).
230. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig. (MSG), No. Civ.
00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 1080790, at *8 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005).
231. Id.
232. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ, 00MDL1328(PAM), 2005
WL 2810682, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
233. Id. at *3.
234. Id.  MSG  has been appealed to the Eighth Circuit. See In re Monosodium Gluta-
mate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328(PAM), 2005 WL 2810682 (D. Minn. Oct. 26,
2005), appeal docketed, No. 03-2997 (8th Cir. Nov. 23, 2005).
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B. APPLYING STANDING DOCTRINE TO DEFINE THE
EMPAGRAN EXCEPTION
Where the pure proximate cause standard has failed, prudential stand-
ing doctrine can answer the question.  A workable definition of the scope
of the Empagran exception is reached by treating it as a question of the
antitrust standing doctrine, modified to encompass the considerations of
comity and inverse deterrence recognized in Empagran, and developed
through the common-law process.235  To be sure, the Empagran Court
noted the difficulty of case-by-case analysis when it stated a bright-line
rule governing suits by plaintiffs injured in wholly foreign commerce, and
at least two commentators, ignoring the common-law history of antitrust
adjudication, have applauded that decision.236  But the bright-line rule,
and the admonition that case-by-case analysis was impractical, was justifi-
cation for the Court’s narrow holding per se regarding claims not con-
nected to an effect on U.S. commerce.  The Court did not purport to
define how lower courts should apply the Empagran exception and cer-
tainly did not establish any per se rule governing it.
What is important about the Empagran exception is just that—it is an
exception to the limitation on extraterritorial reach imposed by the
FTAIA.  Undefined, the exception could be limitless.  Courts in theory
could consider any claim of a nexus to an effect in U.S. commerce to be
sufficient.237  It also could be meaningless—courts in theory could require
a nexus to a domestic effect so strong that no wholly foreign harm would
qualify.238  All that Empagran made clear is that the narrow bright-line
rule it espoused did not define the exception.239  But the decision princi-
ples that led the Court to an understanding of the FTAIA also should, as
235. Case-by-case analysis of a range of factors is the hallmark of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors analysis. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-33 (1983) (antitrust standing is a common-law analysis). See
also Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1986)
(In both situations the infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtu-
ally impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will govern in every case.
Instead, previously decided cases identify factors that circumscribe and guide
the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in
specific circumstances.);
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) (“§ 4 standing analysis
is essentially a balancing test comprised of many constant and variable factors and that
there is no talismanic test capable of resolving all § 4 standing problems”); de Atucha v.
Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (interpreting the Court’s
standing authorities as requiring case-by-case analysis of the Associated Gen. Contractors
factors).
236. See F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004). See
also Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1436 (calling the approach “unwise as a policy matter”);
Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 220-21.
237. The holding of the District of Connecticut in MM Global, accepting a mere allega-
tion that foreign harm was “the result of” an effect in U.S. commerce, might be thought to
be an example of a nearly unlimited definition of the Empagran exception. See MM
Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342 (D. Conn. 2004).
238. See, e.g., eMag Solutions, LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL
172084, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2005).
239. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
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part of a standing analysis, assist a principled understanding of the Em-
pagran exception.
1. Reasons for Relying on a Prudential Standing Analysis
Prudential standing doctrine has strong arguments to recommend it.  A
primary accolade is that the doctrine is the most consistent with the struc-
ture of the U.S. antitrust regime.240  Although the subject matter jurisdic-
tion question under the FTAIA remains essential to determining what
conduct is cognizable in a U.S. antitrust court, the standing inquiry tells a
court which plaintiff can complain about that conduct.241  Another is that
the standing inquiry is malleable and subject to common-law develop-
ment.  It is thus an appropriate, and the only appropriate, repository of
new concerns such as the comity and inverse deterrence concerns that
came to the fore in Empagran.242  Those rationales cannot be fit neatly
into the proximate cause inquiry followed by courts after Empagran.243
They also have no textual basis in any of the antitrust statutes.
Vis-a-vis subject matter jurisdiction, antitrust standing doctrine has all
of the procedural advantages of permitting early dismissal of suits.244  It
adds to those benefits a substantial procedural benefit of waivability
(which subject-matter jurisdiction lacks).245  Early dismissal is especially
important in the realm of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement because
of both comity concerns and over-deterrence concerns.  First, comity con-
240. Related to this structural argument is the fact that whether extraterritoriality is
treated as a standing or as a subject-matter jurisdiction analysis, a private plaintiff necessa-
rily must satisfy the standing inquiry to establish its right to sue under Clayton 4.  If courts
first conduct a proximate cause inquiry to determine the reach of their subject-matter juris-
diction under the FTAIA, that same inquiry will be part of the standing analysis that will
follow. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac VOF, 241 F.3d 420, 431
n.32 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that because the FTAIA analysis was not met, the standing
analysis necessarily would fail).  Respecting the structure of the antitrust laws limits that
redundancy.
241. See supra notes 26, 30-54 and accompanying text.
242. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005)
(We reject the notion that a comity analysis is part of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Comity considerations, including potential conflicts with foreign trade-
mark law, are properly treated as questions of whether a court should, in its
discretion, decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that it already pos-
sesses. Our approach to each of these issues is in harmony with the analogous
rules for extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws.).
243. Tellingly, neither Empagran II, nor any of the other courts analyzing the Em-
pagran exception as a proximate cause inquiry, have even tried to analyze the comity and
inverse deterrence rationales when considering the scope of the exception. See generally
Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D. C. Cir. 2005).
244. See Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416
(2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that a court should begin by analyzing standing);
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trott, J., concur-
ring) (noting that standing analysis is a preliminary inquiry).
245. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (Rule 12(b)(1) arguments of a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time in litigation), with NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 97 n.14 (1984) (Court not addressing antitrust injury issue not
raised by the parties). But see Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d
951, 961 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Courts do not agree on whether antitrust standing can be
waived.”) (citing authorities on both sides of the question).
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cerns regularly are recognized to exist not just in the case of U.S. courts
imposing actual liability in situations in which foreign sovereigns have
regulatory interests, but also in the case of actors required to submit to
U.S. regulatory procedures, including judicial proceedings, where foreign
sovereign regulation is implicated.246  Second, over-deterrence con-
cerns—and the inverse-deterrence concerns that exist at the extreme—
increase the further the litigation is permitted to proceed before the reso-
lution of a dispositive motion.  The very expense of defending against
massive antitrust litigation usually causes defendants to seek settlement
regardless of the merits of the claims, and sometimes with little regard to
the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success in trial.247
Waivability helps to realize the goal of optimization.  Waiver of a
ground for dismissal is a recognition that the benefits to the defendant
and to the court system of dismissal decrease the longer a defendant in
litigation waits to seek it.248  The waiver doctrine also recognizes that at
some point, the investment in litigation by the plaintiffs and by the court
system has reached a level that warrants respect.  When the harm to the
plaintiff from dismissing the case on procedural grounds exceeds the ben-
efit to the defendant from its dismissal, it makes sense to refuse dismissal
on grounds of waiver.  Under a prudential standing analysis, a court re-
tains this flexibility.
2. Updating Antitrust Standing
The prudential standing inquiry developed under interpretations of
Clayton 4 does not appropriately capture the costs and benefits of private
extraterritorial enforcement, which now are understood to include (1) in-
ternational comity ramifications of extraterritorial enforcement, and (2)
harm to the public enforcement regime under the inverse deterrence ra-
tionale.  Those must be included in a modern analysis of which plaintiff is
best situated to sue.249  Doing so will enable tailoring of antitrust reme-
dies to serve the essential deterrence and compensation goals of
246. A common example of bare judicial proceedings alone giving rise to comity con-
cerns is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) context.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1608
(2000 & Supp. 2004).  Courts repeatedly have held that immunity under the FSIA is immu-
nity from suit, not just from liability.  Although the analyses under the FSIA and FTAIA
are not related, as a matter of the first principles comity question the FSIA analysis is
instructive. Cf. United States v. LSL Biotech, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (reliance on
definitions of “directness” under the FSIA to inform its meaning in the FTAIA).
247. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-38
(1989); Stancil, supra note 39, at 996-1000.
248. For example, if the comity or over-deterrence concern implicates the very fact of a
defendant’s being required to submit to discovery, once discovery has been completed or
substantially completed, that harm has been fully wrought.  The benefit of dismissal at that
stage no longer includes the benefits of avoiding expensive and burdensome discovery and
of avoiding being required unfairly to submit to the U.S. antitrust regulatory scheme.
249. The ability of standing analysis to accommodate changing realities is one of its
great strengths. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2005) (relying
on antitrust extraterritoriality decisions because they reflect consideration of circumstances
not considered in earlier Lanham Act decisions).
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antitrust.250
a. New Emphasis on Comity Concerns
The Empagran Court admonished that litigation must not go forward if
foreign comity concerns militated sufficiently strongly against it.251  The
rule following Empagran is that some safeguard must be in place.  As in
the domestic enforcement sphere, with regard to extraterritorial enforce-
ment, courts cannot rely on private plaintiffs to self-select and not bring
suit because of diplomatic concerns.252  A modified prudential standing
analysis permits courts to decline to hear cases that, based on their devel-
oped common-law experience, should not be cognizable.  This flexible
analysis of comity concerns can take account of changing circumstances
horizontally—with regard to which foreign sovereign is in question, and
vertically—over time.
The Empagran litigation is a prime example of the benefits of mallea-
bility in the invocation of foreign comity concerns.  Consider first hori-
zontal variation.  At issue in Empagran were foreign sovereigns with
which the United States has diplomatic ties.  The comity analysis for
other foreign sovereigns might differ.253
The degree to which comity concerns are implicated by extraterritorial
enforcement also depends on the nature of that sovereign’s economic
regulation. Empagran raised comity concerns with regard to four foreign
sovereigns—Australia, Ecuador, Panama, and the Ukraine—whose anti-
trust regulation, or lack of regulation, was threatened with preemption if
the foreign plaintiffs’ claims were permitted to go forward in U.S. court
under U.S. law.254  Scholars analyzing Empagran have ignored the fact
that those countries did not appear in the litigation raising comity con-
cerns.255  The concerns came, instead, from others such as Britain, Ca-
nada, Germany, and Japan—major U.S. trading partners with robust
antitrust regulation.256  The U.S. government, the parties, and other amici
also advanced comity arguments, primarily in the contexts of U.S. allies
with sophisticated antitrust laws.257  Neither scholarly nor judicial analy-
250. Cf. Page, supra note 22, at 1450-52 (arguing that standing optimizes remedies in
the domestic enforcement context).
251. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173-75 (2004).
252. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (noting private plaintiffs’ incentives
to sue in U.S. courts).
253. Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978) (“It has long been
established . . . that it is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to determine
which nations are entitled to sue.”).
254. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
255. See Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 216 (countries with weak antitrust systems have not
complained openly about U.S. extraterritorial regulation).
256. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing amicus involvement of Ca-
nada, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, and
Japan); Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 216 (“regulatory conflicts primarily concern industrial-
ized countries that have robust antitrust laws”).
257. But see Cert.-Stage Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15-7, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724)
(making arguments in the specific context of Australia).
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sis has considered the extent to which the comity concerns that were ad-
vanced were relevant to the particular sovereign nations whose antitrust
regulation—or lack thereof, in the case of Ecuador258— supposedly were
threatened with being undermined.259
In Hartford Fire, the Court observed that some types of extraterritorial
jurisdiction of U.S. economic regulation do not undermine foreign sover-
eigns’ efforts to regulate their own domestic commerce.260  The Court
asked only whether U.S. regulation actually conflicted with regulation by
foreign sovereigns.  Because it did not, extraterritorial jurisdiction was
found.261  There may be a good explanation why foreign amici in Em-
pagran were limited to those nations with sophisticated antitrust regula-
tion.  Sovereign nations without such regulation—but suffering perhaps
substantial harm from cartel conduct in their economies262—may be ill-
inclined to oppose assistance by U.S. courts in maintaining competitive
conditions in their own domestic commerce.263  At a minimum, a court
should explore this question in an individual case before assuming the
Empagran approach applies to a particular foreign sovereign.264
258. Ecuador does not have an antitrust enforcement regime. See Bruce M. Owen,
Competition Policy in Latin America 63 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 268, 2003) (table listing Latin American competition policies
and enforcement agencies).
259. Cf. Podgor, supra note 2, at 29 (“Issues of comity are not concerns when another
country seeks the assistance of the United States.  The strong prosecutorial abilities and
the resources available for prosecution may motivate another country to seek the aid of the
United States in curtailing improprieties occurring within their country.”).
260. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993).
261. Id. at 799.
262. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 812-18 (calculating that in 1997, devel-
oping countries imported approximately $50 billion in goods in channels of trade affected
by cartels—a larger amount as a proportion of total imports and GDP than developed
countries imported); Joseph Francois & Henrik Horn, Antitrust in Open Economies, IIIS
Discussion Paper No. 120, at 15 n.11 (2006) (noting that “a domestic cartel . . . is unam-
biguously bad for overall national welfare”).
263. See Podgor, supra note 2, at 29 (noting “situations when another country welcomes
the United States into their jurisdiction for the purpose of proceeding with [a] prosecu-
tion.”  “This form of cooperative assistance needs to be fostered”). Cf. Levenstein & Sus-
low, supra note 3, at 845-46 (discussing the possibility that courts in countries with more
sophisticated antitrust regimes might provide remedies to foreign plaintiffs injured by car-
tels but lacking an antitrust remedy in their home country) (citing Provimi, Ltd. v. Avenits
Animal Nutrition S.A., [2003] EWHC (QB) 1211 (Eng.) (permitting suit by non-English
citizens over the same vitamins cartel at issue in Empagran)); Francois & Horn, supra note
262, at 15, 20 (discussing the possibility of extraterritorial application of competition pol-
icy).  This analysis ignores the question whether remedying foreign social harm is an appro-
priate use of this country’s judicial resources. See Podgor, supra note 1, at 101-02 (“cost
concerns are equally important”); id. at 92 (citing United States v. Pasquantino, 544 U.S.
349, 371-72 (2005), for the proposition that U.S. prosecutorial resources might be better
devoted elsewhere).
264. The foreign sovereigns at issue in Empagran have not demonstrated an aversion to
extraterritorial jurisdiction, apart from Australia, which has taken active efforts to oppose
U.S. antitrust courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., 1 WALLER, supra note 84, § 4.17
(noting Australia’s “blocking statute”).  Ecuador does not have an antitrust scheme at all.
See supra note 247. But see Francois & Horn, supra note 262, at 15 n.11 (noting that “the
net importer government may also support a domestic cartel”); Levenstein & Suslow,
supra note 3, at 819-20 (noting that “[l]ocal price wars can benefit consumers,” creating a
“possibility . . . [of] short-term benefits for developing country consumers, if their markets
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The “vertical” (temporal) analysis of comity considerations is not con-
stant either.  For any one foreign sovereign, U.S. diplomatic policy to-
ward that country is not unchanging.  Legal rules developed based on the
comity analysis on day zero might not be relevant on day one.265  The
same applies with regard to changing economic regulations worldwide.
The advent of antitrust regulations in foreign countries in recent decades
has been a much remarked phenomenon.266  Justification for extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust laws will decrease as that development
continues and other sovereigns’  regulations become more sophisticated.
Conversely, should there be a slowing or setback in that development, the
need for extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws might in-
crease.  Few issues demand the flexibility of common law analysis so
much as does the comity question.267
b. New Understanding of the Inverse Deterrence Rationale
The inverse deterrence rationale had not been part of the extraterrito-
riality analysis before Empagran.  In Empagran, not only was the U.S.
Department of Justice’s leniency policy discussed, foreign governments as
amici advanced their own amnesty policies as giving rise to inverse deter-
rence concerns.268  The Supreme Court gave substantial deference to
are used to discipline transgressors” from the agreed cartel price and output).  Perhaps for
those reasons, Professor Podgor has argued that foreign governments should be expected
to specifically request an assertion of jurisdiction over a harm felt within their sovereign
borders. See Podgor, supra note 1, at 102.
265. A sufficient example of such temporal change is Iran.  Iran was a plaintiff in Pfizer
Corp. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), and was held in 1978 to be a “person”
permitted to sue under the antitrust laws. See id. at 309, 318.  Today, Iran is a part of what
the Bush administration has declared the “axis of evil” and is a designated state sponsor of
terror. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1
PUB. PAPERS 129, 131 (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (“States like . . . [Iran, Iraq and North Korea] . . . consti-
tute an axis of evil . . . .”).  For Iran’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism, see U.S. Dep’t
of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism (Table), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151
.htm.  The Court in Pfizer noted that it remains “within the exclusive power of the Execu-
tive Branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue.” Pfizer Corp., 434 U.S. at 320;
see also id. at 310 n.1 (referencing nations, including Vietnam, whose suits were not permit-
ted because the governments were not recognized by the U.S. government).
266. See William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Econ-
omies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 361-63 (2000); Delrahim, supra
note 5, at 2 (“there are nearly 100 jurisdictions with antitrust laws of one sort or another,
from Albania to Zambia”).
267. But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (describing legislation as
“more flexible and responsible” than common-law analysis).  Professor Hovenkamp argues
that because of stare decisis principles, common-law adjudication can produce inflexible
results if courts impose per se rules with insufficient underlying common-law percolation.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 118. See also William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in the
O’Connor-Rehnquist Era: A View from Inside the Supreme Court, 20 ANTITRUST 21, 23-24
(2006) (citing to papers of Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Marshall to demonstrate the
difficulties of overturning the per se rule once it has been applied).  Those arguments do
not undermine the assertion in the text.  This article advocates an approach to extraterrito-
riality that minimizes the development of per se rules.
268. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004); Brief
for the Federal Republic of Germany et al. as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioner at 28,
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).  Foreign sovereigns increasingly are using
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those arguments.
Like the comity concerns discussed above, the inverse deterrence ratio-
nale is not static. Analysis of the inverse deterrence concern depends on,
at a minimum, changing Executive Branch enforcement policy.  The De-
partment of Justice’s amnesty program is a matter of prosecutorial discre-
tion, not statute or even administrative regulation.  It can be altered—
limited or expanded—through mere executive fiat.269
Other external effects of the rationale are the prevalence, or lack
thereof, of major cartel behavior.  Cartelization has not been a consistent
phenomenon historically.270  Notably, scholarship demonstrates that
1982, the year of the FTAIA’s enactment, was during a nearly half-cen-
tury lull in the prevalence of multinational cartels.271  The specific issues
of worldwide interdependence that the Empagran litigation has raised
were not well understood at the time the FTAIA was enacted, and inter-
national cartel activity was not a significant driver of the legislation.
c. Optimal Extraterritorial Enforcement
If, as Professor Page has argued, optimization is accomplished through
a standing rationale,272 in the extraterritorial arena, the optimization
goals are best accomplished through a standing rationale extended into
the extraterritorial enforcement sphere.273  The modified prudential
standing analysis will permit antitrust courts efficiently to implement the
policies recognized in Empagran in a manner to avoid over-deterrence
and under-deterrence (comprised in part of inverse deterrence) concerns.
Of course, the deterrence questions incorporate the principle of comity:
regulation that violates comity principles necessarily involves over-deter-
rence (stepping on toes or overlapping regulation) or under-deterrence
(failing to deter when a foreign sovereign seeks assistance from the U.S.
enforcement scheme).
Optimal enforcement, whether in the domestic or extraterritorial
arena, depends on value judgments as to the goal of the regulatory
leniency or amnesty programs as part of a “carrot and stick” approach to anti-cartel en-
forcement. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Charting New Wa-
ters in International Cartel Prosecutions, 20th Annual Nat’l Inst. on White-Collar Crime 2
(March 2, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.pdf. See also
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 805 (describing the development of foreign amnesty
programs).
269. Cf. Max Huffman, Broken Trusts: The Texas Attorney General Versus the Oil In-
dustry, 1889-1909, 15 W. LEGAL HIST. 215 (2002) (book review) (discussing changing exec-
utive enforcement policy); HYLTON, supra note 65, at 48 (describing executive enforcement
decisions as purely discretionary); Podgor, supra note 2, at 24-25 (describing the extent of
prosecutorial discretion and the discretionary nature of internal Justice Department
guidelines).
270. CONNOR, supra note 163, at 1-2 (describing ebbs and flows in cartel activity).
271. Id. at 1 (describing the “inter-war period”).
272. See Page, supra note 22, at 1483-85.
273. Cf. supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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scheme.274  The optimal level of enforcement minimizes the deviation
from that goal.  In the domestic arena, general modern agreement exists
that the goal is maximization of social wealth through the protection of
competition.275  Optimal enforcement domestically will minimize devia-
tion from that goal.276
The value judgment for extraterritorial enforcement requires an an-
swer to the questions, “whose wealth should be maximized, through the
protection of what competition?” Empagran recently has echoed the rule
that the U.S. antitrust laws exist to protect domestic U.S. commerce.277
Optimal extraterritorial enforcement will minimize deviation from that
goal.  Thus, conduct that is harmful to domestic U.S. commerce should be
compensated for and deterred; and conduct that is beneficial to domestic
U.S. commerce should be permitted to continue—even at the potential
expense of permitting harm in foreign commerce to go unremedied.278
i. Extraterritorial Over-deterrence Concerns
Over-deterrence concerns also arise in the context of private extraterri-
torial enforcement. Concern for liability far disproportionate to the effect
of conduct on U.S. commerce risks deterring potential antitrust defend-
ants from engaging in conduct that is economically beneficial domesti-
cally.  The concern for over-deterrence due to excessive liability has three
manifestations in the context of extraterritoriality.  One is an extension of
the notion of a false positive.  The concerns for false positives become
more compelling when the liability that may be imposed is based on
claims by a world-wide plaintiff class.
A related concern is that of overlapping regulation.  A defendant sub-
ject to treble damages liability in a U.S. antitrust court for foreign harm
might also be subject to liability in the courts of a foreign sovereign for
that same harm.279  This especially might occur if overreaching by U.S.
274. See ELEANOR M. FOX, THE MODERNIZATION OF ANTITRUST: A NEW EQUILIB-
RIUM (1981), reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 259, 261 (E.
Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991) (“The isolation of efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust re-
quires a conscious rejection of equally dominant values that underlie the antitrust
statutes.”).
275. See BORK, supra note 74, at ix-xiv; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 1; HYLTON, supra
note 65, at 43-44; POSNER, supra note 74, at 2.
276. This is even at the potential expense of undermining other policy goals with which
antitrust law is not concerned. Cf. Stancil, supra note 39, at 965 (over-deterrence argument
made with reference to the favored “consumer welfare” standard).
277. See supra text following note 146 (arguing Empagran is a definitive modern state-
ment that the goals of the antitrust laws are to protect U.S. commerce).
278. See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (“the
justification for that interference” with the foreign nation’s regulatory authority “seems
insubstantial”); Matsushito Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 486 U.S. 586 (1986) (no
basis to protect against harms offered in Japan when conduct did not harm U.S.
consumers).
279. See Epstein & Greve, supra note 74, at 22 (noting concerns for an “n-front war in
countless and often hostile jurisdictions”); Francois & Horn, supra note 262, at 20 (“Ex-
porting firms in Country 1 would then come under two jurisdictions, and it would here
seem rational that the more stringent of the two applied.”) (failing to account for the
power of private plaintiffs to sue regardless of overlapping foreign jurisdiction); Wolfgang
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plaintiffs and courts encourages retaliatory exercises in extraterritorial
regulation by foreign sovereigns.280
The third manifestation of the over-deterrence concern in the extrater-
ritoriality context is that conduct that harms competition in a foreign
market might be beneficial, or neutral, to competition in domestic com-
merce.  Permitting suit by a plaintiff injured in foreign commerce does
nothing to remedy harm suffered in U.S. commerce, but it chills conduct
that is desirable in U.S. commerce. An example of this third manifesta-
tion of over-deterrence would be a course of price-fixing conduct in a
foreign market used to fund pro-consumer price-cutting in U.S. com-
merce.  In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,281
plaintiffs argued that price fixing by defendants in the Japanese market
was used to fund below-cost pricing in U.S. markets.  Under that scheme,
regulators and consumers in Japan might be concerned about the alleged
price-fixing conduct in that location, but U.S. consumers gained from the
alleged antitrust violations.  Courts in the United States should not be
concerned about harm overseas that is pro-competitive domestically.282
In the specific context of export commerce, the FTAIA expressly im-
plements the policy of avoiding over-deterrence.  Under section 6a(1)(B),
an “effect” that can give rise to antitrust liability in export commerce
must be an effect on the business of U.S. exporters.283  An effect on ex-
port commerce that harms foreign purchasers is explicitly excluded.284
ii. Extraterritorial Under-deterrence Concerns
The opposite concern, and one that motivates plaintiff-friendly deci-
sions in the extraterritoriality analysis, is that of under-deterrence.285  The
Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 31,
45 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (“the [effects] doctrine has the
potential to generate jurisdictional conflicts among the many countries where a given
merger or cartel practice may have an effect”); Podgor, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that an
effects-based test “has few, if any, limits” and that “[t]his is particularly true as society
becomes more globalized”); Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 210-12 (describing the phenome-
non of overlapping regulation and the inability of bilateral agreements to affect private
antitrust litigation). Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 76 (noting the concern for duplica-
tion of damages when a defendant is subject to overlapping federal and state regulation).
280. See Podgor, supra note 2, at 23 (“Opening the door to more extraterritorial prose-
cutions may influence other countries to proceed in a similar fashion.”).  Retaliation is a
result of under-emphasis on the comity concern.
281. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 574 (1986).
282. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 199, at 708-09 (arguing that predation is not a concern
unless the predator can recoup its losses incurred in predation).
283. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (2000) (“conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect . . . on export commerce with foreign nations of a person engaged in
export commerce in the United States”). See 1 WALLER, supra note 84, § 9.7 (describing
the FTAIA’s coverage of exporters).
284. One might argue under the expressio unius canon that this narrow concern for U.S.
exporters proves a broader concern for foreign harm outside the context of export com-
merce.  However, no such argument has been made or accepted.
285. See Pfizer Corp. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978). Cf. McBee v. Delica
Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (“In both the antitrust and the Lanham Act areas,
there is a risk that absent a certain degree of extraterritorial enforcement, violators will
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under-deterrence concern has two manifestations—the traditional con-
cern for liability that is insufficient to deter harmful conduct, and the re-
cently-recognized inverse deterrence concern.
The traditional manifestation, which the Supreme Court recognized in
Pfizer Corp. v. Government of India,286 is that regulatory gaps decrease
the downside risk of liability for global cartels.287  “[P]ersons doing busi-
ness both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into an-
ticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the
expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would
offset any liability to plaintiffs at home.”288  The degree to which this con-
cern is appropriate in the modern day is subject to debate.  A much re-
marked phenomenon since Pfizer Corp. was decided in 1978 is the
development of antitrust agencies worldwide.289  A recent paper by an
antitrust division official notes that “[a]ntitrust authorities throughout the
world have become increasingly aggressive in investigating and sanction-
ing cartels.”290  The result of that change may be that material regulatory
gaps are limited.291
Also, strong questions exist whether a U.S. antitrust court should be
concerned if the remedy under U.S. law fails sufficiently to deter an-
either take advantage of international coordination problems or hide in countries without
efficacious antitrust or trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority.”).
286. 434 U.S. 308.
287. See id. at 315; see also Buxbaum, supra note 6, at 1096-97 (noting arguments that
“aggregate global sanctions against hard-core cartels are insufficient to deter price-fixing”);
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 801; Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 224 (characterizing
global markets as a “loophole” and citing both the problems of jurisdictional gaps and
difficulties for plaintiffs in being required to litigate in multifarious jurisdictions).
288. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313. See Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 205 (“International con-
spiracies profit enormously from these enforcement gaps.”) (citing Julian Clarke & Simon
J. Evenett, The Deterrent Effect of National Anticartel Laws: Evidence from the Interna-
tional Vitamins Cartel, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 689, 689-726 (2003)).  Two commentators re-
cently noted the possibility that the under-deterrence phenomenon observed in Pfizer
Corp. might itself have foreign comity impact.  “The reach of the U.S. antitrust laws may
be arbitrary in the sense that it could treat very differently activities that are economically
indistinguishable from the point of view of developing countries.”  Levenstein & Suslow,
supra note 3, at 848. See also Antitrust Modernization Comm., supra note 179, at 6 (noting
the comity implications of denying suit to foreign plaintiffs).
289. See Kovacic, supra note 266, at 361-63; Delrahim, supra note 5, at 2.  Although
some have argued “anti-cartel enforcement is too difficult for agencies that are relatively
new to antitrust enforcement,” others maintain that view is inaccurate, and that anti-cartel
enforcement should be the primary focus of new regulatory regimes.  Barnett, supra note
79, at 4. See also id. at 4-5 (arguing for international coordinated efforts in criminal en-
forcement); Epstein & Greve, supra note 74, at 1 (noting “multiple (and proliferating)
antitrust authorities”). But see Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 216 (noting the ineffectiveness
of antitrust enforcement in developing countries).
290. Hammond, supra note 268, at 2; see also Barnett, supra note 79, at 4. But see
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 851 (noting that “antitrust institutions either do not
exist in most developing countries or do not have the wherewithal to address this
problem”).
291. Cf. Paul Stephan, Against International Cooperation, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 66, 76 (Richard A. Epstein
& Michael S. Greve, eds. 2004) (noting attention to the possibility of “soft harmonization”
of antitrust laws, defined as establishing baseline levels of antitrust regulation to which
sovereigns may aspire).
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ticompetitive conduct in wholly foreign commerce.  So long as the deter-
rence and compensation functions are served in domestic commerce, that
a cartel realizes profits in the aggregate is a problem for foreign sover-
eigns.  It is not impossible that such a laissez-faire attitude toward unregu-
lated foreign markets will result in sophisticated cartels directing their
conduct only at the regulatory gaps—perhaps even, as alleged in Matsu-
shita, with the effect of funding vigorous competition in U.S. markets.
The second under-deterrence manifestation is the particular concern
recognized in Empagran.  A negative externality of broad private en-
forcement is, paradoxically, decreased future cartel enforcement.292  The
massive civil liability to private plaintiffs risks overbearing the benefits
available to a would-be informant from the Department of Justice’s am-
nesty program.  They are unlikely to disclose participation, which—in a
manner akin to a “mutually assured destruction” principle, has the effect
of cementing cartels.  Because inverse deterrence arises at the extreme of
over-deterrence, like the over-deterrence concerns addressed above, the
inverse deterrence concern becomes all the more relevant when litigation
increases in size—such as a case involving worldwide plaintiff classes.
3. Applying the Updated Standing Analysis to the Empagran Exception
The updated standing analysis requires courts to consider the follow-
ing: (1) the question of antitrust injury; (2) the indirect purchaser ques-
tion from Illinois Brick; and (3) the remaining factors of the availability
of other plaintiffs, the concerns for judicial manageability, and concerns
for the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex apportionment of dam-
ages293—as well as (a) comity and (b) inverse-deterrence concerns.
Those latter concerns are best considered part of what this article has
called “a vaguely defined amalgam of other considerations” that make up
the third facet of the standing inquiry.
Courts deciding whether claims of foreign harm can be brought in U.S.
antitrust courts post-Empagran can apply the modified Associated Gen-
eral Contractors framework to the extraterritoriality problem.  Applica-
tion of the Associated General Contractors factors in the
extraterritoriality arena was undertaken two decades ago in de Atucha v.
Commodity Exchange, Inc.294  In that case, an Argentinean plaintiff who
purchased silver on the London Metals Exchange sought to sue in a U.S.
antitrust court.295  The plaintiff alleged harm resulting from the infamous
effort by the Hunt brothers to monopolize the silver market.296  The
court noted both that the injury suffered was causally remote from effects
in U.S. commerce, and that domestic plaintiffs were available to vindicate
292. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 3, at 848-49 (noting the problem the threat of
civil suit presents to the operation of amnesty programs, and a unique problem associated
with a requirement that the EC reveal the identity of firms receiving amnesty).
293. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
294. de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 514-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
295. Id. at 513.
296. Id.
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the deterrence concern.297  The court denied standing.298 de Atucha did
not have before it the injunction from Empagran that it consider comity
and inverse-deterrence concerns.  Other courts considering prudential
standing arguments have tended to limit their analysis to the question of
antitrust injury—the first, and perhaps foremost, of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors elements, but not the entire question.299
a. Antitrust Injury in Extraterritorial Application
In extraterritorial application, the antitrust injury question is whether
the U.S. antitrust laws exist to remedy the particular foreign harm.  This
question has two parts.  The first—whether the harm, assuming it was
suffered in U.S. commerce, is harm cognizable by the U.S. antitrust
scheme?—is answered by the Brunswick analysis courts have learned to
apply over the past three decades.300  The second part is whether harm
felt in that location is a matter of concern under the U.S. antitrust laws?
After the Supreme Court decided Matsushita in 1986, the answer to the
second question in any extraterritorial situation seemingly was a clear
“no.”  In Matsushita, price fixing in Japan was not within the purview of a
federal court applying U.S. antitrust laws. Matsushita is one application
of the rule—recently repeated by the Empagran Court301—that the anti-
trust laws exist to protect American, not foreign, commerce.302  Accord-
ing to the district court in de Atucha, “Congress did not contemplate
recovery under the antitrust laws by an individual who traded, and was
injured entirely outside of United States commerce.”303  Other courts
have echoed this rules recently.304
Matsushita might be thought an easy case.  It involved circumstances
that undermined any arguments that U.S. antitrust policy was an appro-
priate vehicle to protect the plaintiffs.  In Matsushita, the alleged injury
was accompanied by benefits to U.S. consumers—much like the supposed
harm in Brunswick Corp.305  It was thus at worst neutral, and at best,
297. Id. at 518.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 307 (3d Cir. 2002); In
re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 563 (D. Del. 2006).
300. See 1 WALLER, supra note 84, § 9:7.
301. See supra text preceding note 146.
302. See de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 517 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S.
308, 314 (1978), and 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statements of Senator Sherman referring
to the “interests of the United States”); 2 WALLER, supra note 19, § 13:23 (“Congress has
stated that [the Sherman Act] was intended, first, to protect the competitive health of U.S.
markets . . . and second . . . to protect export opportunities for American-based firms.”).
303. de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 518. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., No. 03-
0737, slip op. at 1-2 (Tex. Oct. 20, 2006) (applying Texas law and holding extraterritorial
relief is not available unless that relief promotes competition in Texas).
304. See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 307; In re Intel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
305. See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 394 (2d Cir. 2002) (“If conduct
affecting foreign markets has a substantial but beneficial effect on our markets, such con-
duct does not implicate the concerns of the antitrust laws.”).
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competitively beneficial, in U.S. commerce.306 Empagran is a more gen-
erally applicable example of a case that fails the first step in the modified
standing analysis.  Unlike Matsushita, there is no basis for reading the
conduct at issue in Empagran as benefiting U.S. consumers.307  The
Court’s narrow holding was limited to plaintiffs suffering injury with no
connection to harm felt in U.S. commerce.  Like the Court in Matsushita,
the Empagran Court believed the justification for interference with the
foreign sovereigns’ regulation was “insubstantial.”308
Allegations that might support standing for plaintiffs claiming wholly
foreign harm would tend to establish a sufficiently proximate causal rela-
tionship—like the allegations in eMag Solutions of present intent and
ability to engage in geographic arbitrage to end run foreign fixed prices.
Such evidence would tend to show that the harm suffered outside the
United States was inseparable from harm suffered in U.S. commerce, and
if it was inseparable, it would be harm of the sort meant to be prevented.
b. Directness in the Extraterritorial Context
The Illinois Brick element requires the plaintiff to be a direct purchaser
to have standing to sue for an antitrust violation.  According to recent
scholarship analyzing Empagran, “[i]n foreign-purchaser cases,” the indi-
rect-purchaser sort of remoteness “does not arise.  Often, the foreign
plaintiff purchases directly from the wrongdoers.”309  The indirectness at
play is instead a function of the injury element.  In the sense that a for-
eign purchaser’s claim to antitrust injury is derivative of the claim of a
purchaser in the domestic market, every foreign purchaser is an “indirect
purchaser.”  Its right to sue depends on the existence of an effect in U.S.
commerce causing harm to a different plaintiff.  According to the court in
de Atucha, the Illinois Brick “indirect purchaser” analysis “is not an is-
sue” in a case dealing with foreign purchasers but lacking “innocent
middlemen.”310
No need exists to write the indirect purchaser rule out of the antitrust
standing analysis in the extraterritoriality context.  Like the injury ele-
ment, cases could arise in which the foreign plaintiff fails Illinois Brick
and suffered its harm overseas as well.  A foreign purchaser that buys
from a foreign distributor, which in turn had paid artificially high prices
due to a price-fixing cartel, fails Illinois Brick—but it may not satisfy the
modified standing analysis for other reasons as well.  The concerns for
duplicate recovery on which Illinois Brick is based are as strong here as in
the case of wholly domestic commerce.
306. Cf. BORK, supra note 74, at 133 (arguing that tie breaker cases should be resolved
in favor of non-intervention); Stancil, supra note 39, at 965 (discussing the phenomenon of
“Type 1 Errors” that entail holding illegal conduct that is “in fact competitively neutral or
even procompetitive”).
307. Likewise with the allegations in de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 512.
308. See supra text preceding note 146.
309. Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1444.
310. de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 514.
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c. Remaining Standing Factors
The other plaintiff factor, in extraterritorial application, asks whether a
plaintiff suffered harm in domestic commerce and is thus better situated
than the foreign plaintiff before the court to vindicate the purposes of the
U.S. antitrust laws.  If there is no other plaintiff, or if the other plaintiff
cannot be relied on to bring suit on its own behalf, it may be necessary to
permit even a less-than-ideal foreign plaintiff to sue.311
The FTAIA permits a plaintiff suffering wholly foreign harm to rely on
effects in domestic commerce to sue if there is a sufficient nexus to effects
in domestic commerce.  Of course, if the domestic effects have resulted in
injury to other plaintiffs, those plaintiffs are available to sue to vindicate
the purposes of the antitrust laws, and because their injuries more di-
rectly implicate concerns at which the U.S. antitrust scheme is directed,
they are better situated to vindicate those concerns.312  The possibility of
a suit also by the foreign plaintiff raises the specters of over-deterrence
and, in the extreme, inverse deterrence.313  Thus, the other plaintiff factor
would not overcome tenuous antitrust injury allegations under this hypo-
thetical.  But if the domestic plaintiff does not exist, or if it cannot be
relied on to sue, it may be appropriate to permit a foreign plaintiff to sue
over wholly foreign harm despite more tenuous antitrust injury allega-
tions.314  This factor shows why courts that rely solely on the question of
antitrust injury to conclude a foreign purchaser lacks standing are short-
sighted.315
The manageability factor primarily raises questions whether the claims
before the court are so numerous, and perhaps raise such difficult issues
because of the geopolitical ramifications, that they would overwhelm the
U.S. court system.  If so, they risk raising the costs of enforcement to the
defendant and to the court system to a degree that it exceeds the benefits
of enforcement.316  It is the sheer number of potential plaintiffs with
311. Cf. Pfizer Corp. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1981) (justifying a cause of
action for foreign plaintiffs in part by the necessity of filling the deterrence purposes of the
antitrust laws); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982) (reading Pfizer
Corp. for the proposition that broadly interpreting the class of persons entitled to sue
under Section 4 vindicates the deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws).
312. According to the de Atucha court, “individuals who traded on United States ex-
changes and who may have suffered injury . . . are an identifiable class of persons whose
claims [can] ‘vindicate the public interest.’” de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 518.  In de Atucha,
as in Empagran, claims by domestic purchasers were proceeding in the Southern District of
New York. See id. at 518 n.21 (citing cases).
313. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing the “over-deterrence”
concerns for chilling useful conduct through excess potential liability); supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text (discussing the paradoxical “inverse deterrence” concern that
arises when excessive liability hardens cartels and makes detection more difficult).
314. See de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 518 (noting the importance of deterrence
rationales).
315. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 307 (3d Cir. 2002).
316. See Cavanagh, supra note 146, at 1443 (noting that “‘massive and complex dam-
ages litigation’” will involve “equally massive and complex foreign evidence”) (quoting
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545
(1983)).
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strong incentives to bring suit in U.S. antitrust courts seeking U.S. reme-
dies that causes concern.  But if the numbers of plaintiffs prove not to be
massive—in other words, if only one potential plaintiff exists, and that
plaintiff suffered harm in foreign commerce—the manageability concern
favors permitting suit by that plaintiff.317  As in the domestic arena, man-
ageability does not tend to encourage standing, but can discourage it if
the factor’s implicated.
Like manageability, the dangers of duplicate recovery and complex
damages apportionment increase, as does the number of plaintiffs and the
variations in economic systems in which harm is alleged to have occurred.
Worldwide plaintiff classes present particular concerns due to the sheer
number of potential plaintiffs.  Finally, the concern for complexity is
heightened when one considers the range of different economic systems
worldwide in which remedies must be determined.
d. Comity and Inverse Deterrence
i. Comity
de Atucha can be seen as an example of the comity consideration at
play.  In de Atucha, the plaintiff’s injury was incurred in a wholly foreign
market regulated by its own antitrust scheme.318  The foreign sovereign at
issue—Great Britain—was one of the industrialized Empagran amici with
its own robust antitrust laws.319  Although under the Hartford Fire analy-
sis comity considerations would not preclude the exercise of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over the conduct complained of, the comity analysis under
Empagran—with its concerns for overlapping regulation and stepping on
the toes of a foreign sovereign (including an inverse-deterrence concern
based on a foreign amnesty program)—militates in favor of a federal
court staying its hand on prudential grounds.
The comity consideration, properly undertaken (instead of being ig-
nored on remand by the Empagran II court) might have suggested a dif-
ferent result as to some of the Empagran plaintiffs.  Certainly concerns of
overlapping regulation did not exist in the case of Ecuador, which as of
today lacks its own antitrust scheme.  One commentator has argued re-
cently that Panama’s antitrust regime, although it appears robust, is
fledgling by comparison to that of the United States.320  Those foreign
sovereigns have not publicly expressed resentment at extraterritorial anti-
trust regulation by the United States.  And, as this Article previously has
suggested, comity considerations might support regulating against harm
in Ecuadorian commerce, if in doing so U.S. courts provide much needed
assistance in protecting that economy from the harms caused by cartel
activity.
317. Cf., e.g., de Atucha, 608 F. Supp. at 514.
318. See id. (harm occurred on the London Mercantile Exchange).
319. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
320. See Wurmnest, supra note 3, at 222-24.
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Courts faced with applying the modified prudential standing analysis
should inquire whether the particular foreign sovereign’s antitrust
scheme—or lack thereof—would be adversely affected.  Such evidence
might be testimony by experts in the particular foreign scheme, or amicus
participation by the U.S. Department of State or the foreign government.
Evidence as to whether the particular sovereign had its own amnesty pro-
gram (like Germany) and whether the U.S. program was threatened with
being undermined by this action would be important.
ii. Inverse Deterrence
Application of the inverse deterrence rationale should parallel the
manageability concern.  If permitting plaintiffs alleging foreign harm to
sue in federal court reflects a dramatic increase in the potential damage
awards, government enforcement efforts are threatened.321  If permitting
plaintiffs with foreign harm to sue has only a minimal increase in the total
liability exposure of the defendants, the inverse deterrence rationale is
not implicated.  The size of the necessary increase to implicate inverse
deterrence would be difficult to pinpoint exactly.  Two principles may
help inform the question.  First, a three-times increase in the amount of
liability above the level necessary for compensating victims might approx-
imate the level that can be tolerated before standing is denied on inverse
deterrence grounds.  Second, close cases should be resolved in favor of
denying standing rather than permitting it.
The suggested yardstick of a three-times increase in the amount of lia-
bility is based on the de-trebling provision of the Antitrust Criminal Pen-
alty Enhancement and Reform Act, which limits damages to the
compensatory level for defendants in civil suits that participated in the
Department of Justice leniency program.322  Professor Page convincingly
argued in 1985 that the treble damages remedy, combined with classical
standing doctrine, appropriately accomplished the deterrence and com-
pensation goals of civil antitrust enforcement.323  Professors Hovenkamp
and Hylton recently have seconded the argument that treble damages
make sense as a measure of deterrence of cartel activity, which (as op-
posed to merger activity or other, less hard-core antitrust violations) is
undertaken in secret and is thus difficult to uncover.324  If treble damages
appropriately serve the goal of optimizing remedies, harm to the public
enforcement scheme under the inverse-deterrence rationale in a treble-
damages world is not a concern.  Thus, with the de-trebling provisions in
the Enhancement and Reform Act, optimal remedies still would be
321. Facts bearing on the under-deterrence and inverse-deterrence rationales also
would be relevant.  For example, evidence that the defendant specifically aimed its conduct
at the foreign market because of the lack of regulation would demonstrate a need for a
U.S. court to regulate that conduct.
322. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, § 213(a), 118 Stat. 661, 666 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2005)).
323. See Page, supra note 22, at 1487-88. See also HYLTON, supra note 65, at 60.
324. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 66-68; HYLTON, supra note 65, at 58-66.
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achieved under a standing rationale that allowed for “re-trebling”—per-
mitting plaintiffs suffering wholly foreign harm to sue to vindicate that
harm in U.S. courts so long as the total remedy to be awarded is not more
than three times the compensatory damages due for harm suffered in
U.S. commerce.325
The inverse deterrence rationale commands resolving close cases in
favor of not permitting the foreign plaintiff standing to sue.  This is be-
cause of the potential for a downward spiral in enforcement if excessive
civil liability is permitted to interfere with public enforcement efforts.  If
the leniency program is frustrated when cartels are cemented under the
mutually assured destruction principle, civil cases—such as the Empagran
litigation, but also many other private follow-on suits—will not proceed
because cartels will remain cloaked.  The effect will be seriously to under-
mine cartel deterrence such that even treble damages liability in civil ac-
tions will under-deter.326  But the under-deterrence complaint is not
realistic if standing is denied to foreign plaintiffs, because criminal en-
forcement and treble-damages civil suits by domestic plaintiffs remain
available against all members except the first to disclose the cartel re-
mains a possibility.327
V. CONCLUSION
In Empagran, the Supreme Court drew only a narrow bright-line rule.
The exception to that rule, for any wholly foreign harm with a sufficient
nexus to a domestic U.S. effect, has engendered substantial confusion, a
state heightened by the Court’s failure adequately to explain the ratio-
nale for its narrow holding or to prescribe an approach to implementing
the Empagran exception.  The proximate cause inquiry courts have set-
tled on, relying heavily on the lower court’s opinion on remand in Em-
pagran, is neither procedurally workable nor doctrinally supportable.
This Article offers a solution.  The well-established and regularly ap-
plied prudential antitrust standing analysis is readily imported, with mod-
ifications from Empagran, into the extraterritoriality framework.
Applying standing doctrine extraterritorially, courts should examine the
elements of the Associated General Contractors framework to determine
whether the particular plaintiff is well situated to vindicate the purposes
of the antitrust laws.  Modified for extraterritorial application, the analy-
sis includes consideration of comity and inverse-deterrence rationales
that have become relevant since Empagran.  The now-seven factor pru-
dential standing analysis requires courts to consider whether the plaintiff
(1) has suffered antitrust injury, (2) is a direct purchaser (if relevant), and
(3) satisfies other considerations—the existence of other plaintiffs, the
325. The proposed approach may have the effect of undermining Congressional intent
in enacting the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act.
326. See HYLTON, supra note 65, at 58 (arguing that if the probability of a successful
suit is less than fifty percent, “treble damages fall below the optimal level”).
327. But see Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978).
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manageability of the litigation with that plaintiff before the court, the
danger of complex apportionment or duplicate recovery, international
comity concerns, and concerns for harm to the public enforcement
regime.
Although analyzing the entire set of considerations might be new expe-
rience for courts schooled in the pre-Empagran extraterritoriality analy-
sis, a body of common law thinking will develop to assist courts in
balancing the policies of deference to foreign sovereign regulation; defer-
ence to U.S. government enforcement; concerns for protecting plaintiffs
and under-deterrence; concerns for over-deterrence; and other costs and
benefits associated with antitrust enforcement.328  The standing analysis
will permit courts the flexibility they require to adjust for changing under-
standings of those policies and other factors perhaps not yet recog-
nized.329  As the question how to define the Empagran exception works
its way through the courts, and perhaps back to the Supreme Court,330
the approach outlined here promises consistent and doctrinally correct
decisions.
328. Common-law analysis is not novel to federal courts applying the U.S. antitrust
laws. See generally id. at 31-37; POSNER, supra note 74, at 1.  Facility with the common law
process is particularly present in the private right of action setting. See Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531-37 (1983).
329. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
330. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 830 (“Courts in various circuits already have an-
swered this question differently since Empagran.”).
